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Abstract
Novel early stage ideas face uncertainty on the expertise needed to elaborate
them, which creates a need to circulate them widely to find a match. Yet as
information is not excludable, shared ideas may be stolen, reducing incentives
to innovate. Still, in idea-rich environments inventors may share them without
contractual protection. Idea density is enhanced by firms ensuring rewards to
inventors, while their legal boundaries limit idea leakage. As firms limit idea
circulation, the innovative environment involves a symbiotic interaction: firms
incubate ideas and allow employees leave if they cannot find an internal fit;
markets allow for wide ideas circulation of ideas until matched and completed;
under certain circumstances ideas may be even developed in both firms and
markets.
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Introduction

The role of innovation in economic growth is well recognized (Romer, 1990), yet the
process of generating innovative ideas is still a novel field. The literature has focused
on intellectual property rights as incentive for invention (Nordhaus, 1969, Gallini and
Scotchmer, 2001). We focus here on an earlier stage in the innovation process, when
novel but incomplete ideas are too vague to be granted patent rights, since they are
still half-baked and in need of further elaboration. While the development of standard
ideas can be planned, for truly novel concepts the next step for their development is
unclear, and the missing expertise cannot be identified ex ante. So new ideas need
to circulate widely to find the right match. This exposes inventors to the risk of idea
theft as information is not excludable.
To understand this trade-oﬀ, we study an environment when all agents choose
whether to produce ideas or to seek to elaborate ideas of others. Our fundamental
assumptions are that early stage ideas are half-baked and valueless until elaborated
further by another individual with the right complementary expertise (which we term
a complementor). When an agent with an idea is matched with a complementor, it
is optimal for them to cooperate to develop the concept.1 The problem of idea theft
arises when the matched individual lacks the complementary fit, but acquires the
idea.
The common assumption in the literature is that agents cannot commit not to
steal an idea before hearing it. According to Arrow (1962), a listener to an idea
would not know how to price it, yet afterwards it is no longer optimal to pay the
disclosing party. Indeed, agents frequently involved in assessing new ideas, such as
venture capitalists, academic researchers and Hollywood producers, routinely refuse
to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).
We seek to answer two basic questions. Why, if asking for an NDA is always
beneficial for the issuer, would the other party not agree to sign it? Prior literature
points to contractual imperfections and the possibility of extortion (Anton and Yao,
2002, 2003, 2004).2 Second, if indeed most ideas are shared without contractual
protection, how can inventors protect their claim? Previous work has analyzed the
1

Cooperation is possible as ideas are in principle contractible: if they are shared verbally, they
may also be written down.
2
NDAs are sometimes employed at late stages of idea elaboration, to formalize commitments to
a well defined project (Bagley and Dauchy, 2008).
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problem of sharing a single idea between two agents (Anton and Yao 1994, 2004),
while we examine the creation and circulation of many ideas among a large set of
agents.
In the model, at each date agents choose whether to invent, or to be matched
with agents who may either have ideas or be free-riding as well. If a good fit is found
for an idea, both parties have incentives to cooperate. However, if the idea is shared
with someone unable to elaborate it, there can be no gain from cooperating. So in an
open market exchange, ideas circulate through a sequence of agents, not necessarily
their inventors, until matched to a complementor. From an ex-post perspective, a free
circulation of ideas is most eﬃcient in ensuring their elaboration. However, frequent
idea stealing may deny the inventor a suﬃcient reward for the initial concept.
We first derive the conditions under which idea protection fails endogenously.
Agents have limited memory so they can recall at most one idea. We show that
there always exists an equilibrium where no one signs NDAs, even for an arbitrarily
small drafting cost. In addition, when ideas are suﬃciently frequent, there may be no
equilibria where all agents sign NDAs.3 In general, ideas will circulate unprotected
when the threat not to disclose without a NDA is not credible.
Next we seek to understand what context creates high idea density to compensate
for idea stealing. We argue that next to independent agents, firms are a source of
ideas because they can create an internal environment where ideas can be shared and
idea generation can be rewarded. We argue that such an environment requires that
firms to develop a local reputation for transparency among its employees. In addition,
firms use their legal boundary to control the leaking of internal idea, ensuring a safe
internal idea exchange.
Yet some ideas will not be resolved within firms when no matching skill is found.
Open knowledge strategies allow unresolved ideas to leave the firm to spawn new
ventures. So markets benefits from idea incubators such as firms (or academic institutions) to increase the rate of idea generation. As a conclusion, coexistence of open
firms and markets produces an optimal environment for idea generation and their
completion by wider circulation.
In this approach, firms can emerge as a solution to a market failure where agents
3

This reflects a similar paradox as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1983), who show that financial
prices cannot be fully informative as there would be no gain to collect information. In our context,
if there is no risk of idea theft there are no opportunists, so at the margin the NDAs are superfluous.
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who accept employment are bound by trade secret law, which can be thought of
as a collective non-disclosure agreement. In exchange, the firm has to commit to
reward creative employees, a commitment which we argue need to be backed by
reputation. We assume that a firm owner can make a costly investment in building
a local reputation by creating visibility of her actions among the firm’s employees
(Kreps, 1986). The threat of loss of corporate reputation for fair dealing ensures that
employees agree to contractually commit to sharing and not stealing ideas inside the
firm, even though they may refuse to sign an equivalent contract with an individual
agent who has more limited visibility and thus a limited punishment in case of breach.
As the employment contract implies respect for firm trade secrets, the firm can provide
a safe idea exchange, and a safer return to idea generators.
Firms incur costs for reputation creation and monitoring the flow of ideas, so
the density of firms depends on their return relative to independent activity. But
the fundamental cost of a firm here is that it contains idea circulation within firm
boundaries, thus limiting the set of possible matching expertise. This leads to our
second main result: just as market failure creates a need for idea-incubating firms,
firm failure to develop some internal projects creates a role for markets to complete
those ideas, increasing the density of firms in the market. This requires firms to
pursue an open knowledge approach, allowing employees to spin-oﬀ their ideas that
could not be used internally (Lewis and Yao, 2003; Sevilir, 2009). Thus, in our
approach firms and markets complement one another, each compensating for some
ineﬃciency of the other. Firms incubate ideas, while markets increase their chances
of elaboration. This complementarity suggests a natural symbiosis of open firms and
markets, as it is the case in innovative environments such as Silicon Valley.4

Relationship to the theoretical literature
Following Schumpeter (1926, 1942), this paper treats a new idea as a novel combination of existing factors (see also Biais and Perotti, 2008, and Weitzman, 1998).
In the case of a truly novel idea, unlike conventional team production, the process of
discovery by matching skills cannot be planned. As a result, a broad circulation of
4

Note that by firms we mean large multi-project firms, rather than entrepreneurial single-project
start-ups which we associate with markets.

3

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper436

4

Hellman and Perotti: The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets

ideas is critical for innovation, as it allows maximum chance of elaboration. Saxenian
(1994) emphasizes “cross-pollination” and open networking as a main cause of Silicon
Valley’s innovative success. We can rationalize such an environment thanks to the
explicit dynamic game where idea density sustains their free circulation. Haessler et
al. (2009) show that idea sharing may occur in a dynamic model with repeated interaction, and provide some supporting evidence. For a fascinating review of historical
periods of high idea density and free circulation, see Meyer (2003).
The literature on innovation has long recognized the non-excludability of information as a key obstacle for innovation. Aghion and Tirole (1994) studied the optimal
allocation of control over innovative ideas. Anton and Yao (1994) show that inventors
can ex-post secure some value by threatening to transmit the idea more broadly, creating more competitors. Anton and Yao (2002, 2004) show how partial or sequential
disclosure of ideas helps inventors secure a larger payoﬀ (see also Bhattacharya and
Guriev, 2006, and Cestone and White, 2003)). The basic mechanism is the threat
to disseminate an idea if stolen. Some papers considers instead limiting the circulation of ideas. Baccara and Razin (2006, 2008) examine whether inventors may buy
out all idea holders, or allow some leakage. Rajan and Zingales (2001) examine how
a hierarchy may prevent idea-stealing by granting access to its technology only to
dedicated employees. Ueda (2004) and Chemmanur and Chen (2006) examines the
trade-oﬀ of talking to uninformed investors versus venture capitalists who may steal
the idea. Silveira and Wright (2007) examine a matching model where non-rival ideas
can be traded. Idea diﬀusion models where the number of agents with the same idea
increases over time are quite complex, so our focus is on the simpler case of (ex post
eﬃcient) idea circulation without diﬀusion.
Biais and Perotti (2008) show that an unpatentable idea may be safely shared with
agents known to be highly complementary experts, and implemented by a contingent
partnership. This paper pursues the eﬀect of complementarity one step further or rather earlier - by allowing the complementary agent not just to screen, but to
elaborate the idea. In a related approach, Stein (2008) studies the complementarity of information shared sequentially in the elaboration of a project. Bolton and
Dewatripont (1994), and Novaes and Zingales (2004) examine idea generation and
communication within firms. Johnson (2002) and Lerner and Tirole (2002) examine
idea exchanges in an open-source context.
In our model, firms emerge to compensate for opportunism in market interaction,
4
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as in Coase (1937). Holmström and Roberts (1998) suggest that ideas, and the people
who generate them, belong at the core of any theory of the firm. An employee’s idea
is an intangible real asset in principle owned by the firm, but which cannot be claimed
unless the employee reports it. Loss of firm reputation to reward invention (Kreps,
1986) is costlier than the breach of an individual promise observed by few other
agents.
In section 2 we develop the basic model, focusing on idea sharing in markets and
the use of precontracting with NDAs. Section 3 studies idea circulation within firms
and across firm boundaries, where firms and markets coexist. Section 4 presents
simple extensions and discusses the empirical evidence, in particular on open firm environments and firm spawning. We conclude with some thoughts for further research.

2

Idea circulation in a pure market setting

2.1

Basic assumptions

We first examine the interaction among market agents in an environment without
any firms. The base model has an infinite number of periods, with a discount factor
of δ. All agents are risk-neutral and infinitely-lived.
We assume that ideas are too preliminary to be patentable. However, we assume
that it is possible to write down ideas, and therefore to contract on ideas. Non
Disclosure Agreements (NDAs henceforth) can be used to contractually protect idea.
Whether agents choose to contract or not is endogenous. In sections 2.1 - 2.6 we
simplify the exposition by assuming that agents do not use any NDAs; Section 2.7
examines the model with NDAs; Section 2.8 derives the conditions under which agent
do or don’t use NDAs.
At the beginning of each period, agents decide whether to generate an idea, or
interact with others to elaborate ideas (later we let agents also start firms). Each
activity lasts one period. Generating an idea requires a private cost ψ, and we denote
idea generators by G. For simplicity we assume that each agent always succeeds to
generating an idea, which he will seek to complete with someone else the following
period.5 All active agents (i.e., not busy generating ideas) are matched at random.
5

An earlier version of the paper allowed for a more general specification where the probability
of success was a parameter γ ∈ (0, 1]. The comparative statics of γ were straightforward, so we
simplify the model by setting γ = 1.
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We denoted by I “idea-bearing” agents have ideas to elaborate (whether their own
creation or stolen in previous periods). Agents without any idea, denoted by O (or
“opportunists”), seek a match to elaborate others’ ideas without contributing an idea
themselves. Ideas can be carried across periods, although due to limited memory
each agent can remember one idea at most. Whether an active agent carries a valid
idea can only be ascertained when the agents interact after being matched. Matched
agents cannot observe each other’s prior history. Since there is an infinite number of
agents active in the market, the chance that two agents are matched repeatedly is
negligible.
Successful elaboration of an idea requires an idea-specific fit between individual
skills, which cannot be identified ex-ante. Thus to find out whether an idea fits the
skills of two agents, it needs to be shared.6 Denote the probability of an idea-specific
fit by φ, the chance that the idea-bearer finds a “complementor” by a random match.
With probability φ there is no fit, and the two agents are “substitutes”.7 Two matched
agents share their ideas, so every match shares zero, one or two ideas. When an idea
finds the matched skill to complete it, it can get implemented by a cooperative eﬀort,
generating a net payoﬀ z.
If two well-matched agents fail to cooperate and seek to implement the idea with
someone else in a later period, competition is such that the sum of their expected
individual returns z0 is less than the cooperative return, i.e., z > 2z0 . Moreover, the
delay reduces the discounted value of the payoﬀ. This ensures that once two agents
have an idea that fits, cooperation is the eﬃcient strategy. If instead there is no fit,
the agents optimally agree on who should continue to pursue the idea further to avoid
competition.8
Each period of interaction has three stages. First, the two agents share their own
ideas to find out whether there is a fit. If there is a fit, the two agents negotiate
the sharing of profit, sign an agreement and implement the developed project. Two
agents can implement two projects at the same time.
In any given period there are three types of agents: Agents working on their own,
6

In Hellmann and Perotti (2005), we consider the case where agents know but can hide their type.
In this case, substitutes may misrepresent their types, discouraging idea-bearers from pursuing their
idea, and then secretly steal it.
7
Throughout the paper a bar above a probability denotes its complement, so that φ ≡ 1 − φ. .
8
Since the idea is contractible, a feasible implementation of the ex post eﬃcient noncompetitive
arrangement is that the two agents contract that the winner of a coin toss is the owner of the idea.

6

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 436 [2010]

termed “generators”, attempt to generate new ideas and are not matched for the
period. Matched agents may be either “idea-bearers” or “opportunists” with no own
idea to share. We denote the relative fraction of these three types by nG , nI and nO ,
where nG + nI + nO = 1.
A critical variable which the model endogenizes is the density of ideas in circulation, measured by the fraction θ of matched agents carrying an idea:
θ=

nI
nI + nO

This fraction θ of agents who carry ideas reflect individual choices to either spend
time developing an idea or to act opportunistically. The model endogenizes this
natural metric for the degree of innovation in the economy under diﬀerent forms of
idea exchange. We start with pure market exchange.

2.2

Bargaining

We assume that all bargaining follows the Nash solution.9 As we will see below,
most bargaining situations in this model are perfectly symmetric, so other bargaining
solutions, such as Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating oﬀer game, yield the same results.
We first examine the bargaining game in the absence of any NDAs. Section 2.7 will
address bargaining with NDAs.
The bargaining situation naturally diﬀers according to how many ideas are present,
and how many ideas fit. Consider first the case where there is only one idea, and
it doesn’t fit - this happens with 2θθφ. Because ideas can be stolen, both parties
have the same outside option, irrespective of which partner had idea. However, since
z > 2z0 , it is optimal to avoid competition. The two agents agree that only one of
them should take the idea into the next period. It is therefore optimal to flip an even
1
coin, i.e., to let either agent take the idea further with probability . Idea stealing
2
thus occurs in equilibrium, and it is overt, in the sense that both parties are fully
aware of it.10
9

Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) provide a foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution, as the outcome of an alternating oﬀer bargaining game with an infinitesimal probability
that a player exits the game.
10
We may ask how to enforce this eﬃcient continuation. The two agents can write a contract
that guarantees one of them the right to continue. Such a contract can be thought of as an ex-post
nondisclosure agreement. This is fundamentally diﬀerent from an ex-ante nondisclosure agreement,
since at the ex-post stage, both agents know the idea and want to ensure that only one of the carries

7
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Consider next the case where there is only one idea, and it fits - this happens with
2θθφ. Since z > 2z0 , it is always eﬃcient to implement the project, generating a joint
value of z. The outside options of both agents are again symmetric, because of idea
stealing. That is, in case of disagreement the situation is similar to the above, i.e.,
1
each partner takes the idea with probability . The equilibrium bargaining outcome
2
z
is therefore an equal split, where each agent gets .
2
Consider now the case where there are two ideas. If neither idea fits (which
2
happens with θ2 φ ), each partner simply continues with his idea. If both ideas fit
(which happens with θ2 φ2 ), the joint value is 2z, and the outside option is that each
partner continues with his idea. The equilibrium bargaining outcome is therefore that
the two agents split the total surplus equally, each receiving a value of z. If only one
idea fits (which happens with 2θ2 φφ), then the joint value of cooperation is z, and
the outside option is that each partner continues with his idea. Each partner receives
1
z
a value , and a probability of taking the idea that did not fit into the next period.
2
2
We note that because ideas can be stolen, all the bargaining outcomes are perfectly symmetric. There is an interesting diﬀerence between the case of one versus
two ideas. If there is only one idea, then the two partners enter the bargaining game
asymmetrically, but leave symmetrically. Intuitively, the opportunist (O type) benefits but the idea-bearer (I type) loses out. However, if there are two ideas, then
both partners enter and exit the bargaining game symmetrically. Put diﬀerently, if
two idea-bearers meet, there are no winners and losers. This insight plays an important role in the analysis of section 2.8, as it suggests that protecting ideas is only
worthwhile when an idea-bearer worries about being matched with an opportunist.
it forward.
Writing an ex-post contract is not even necessary if the agreement is self-enforcing. Suppose the
first agent won the coin flip and caries the idea into the next period. Consider a deviation by the
second agent to also pursue the idea. For simplicity, let us focus on a one-period deviation. It is
easy to see that if the one-period deviation is not profitable, neither will a multi-period deviation
be. With probability φ2 , the two agents both find a fit in the next period and compete, generating
returns z0 . With probability φφ, the deviant agent is the only one to find a fit, generating returns
φ
z0 . The second agents deviation is unprofitable whenever φφz + φ2 z0 < 0 ⇔ z0 < − z. This
φ
condition thus requires that agents make suﬃcient losses in case of competition, i.e. that the cost
of implementing the idea under competition outweighs the benefits under monopoly.

8
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2.3

Dynamics of idea generation and circulation

To determine the equilibrium fractions of types and thus idea density, consider an
arbitrary period t. The number of idea-bearers is composed of two types. There
are nG,t−1 generators with new ideas. Last period there were nI,t−1 idea-bearers,
of which a fraction φ found a fit and implemented the idea and φnI,t−1 old ideas
continue circulating in period t. Thus the total number of undeveloped ideas is
1
nI,t = nG,t−1 + φnI,t−1 . In the steady state, nI = nG . Straightforward calculations
φ
(see appendix) reveal that
nG =

θ
θφ
θ
, nI =
and nO =
.
1 + θφ
1 + θφ
1 + θφ

The value of θ is determined endogenously in each of the idea exchange equilibria
derived below.
In the case of a market equilibrium, every idea is circulated until it finds a match,
so the probability that an idea is implemented is 1.11 However, many generators
receive no economic reward. The appendix shows that the probability of a generator
2φ
implementing his own idea is given by
< 1.12
2 − φ(1 + θφ)

2.4

The choice to generate and elaborate ideas

We now derive expected utilities of pursuing a G, I and O strategy. We denote lifetime utilities with U. Agents not carrying an idea from last period (I) will choose
among a G and a O strategy. The utility of an opportunist is given by
z
1
1
UO = θδUO + θφ( + δUO ) + θφ( δUO + δUI )
2
2
2
where θ is determined endogenously.
The first term reflects the case where the agent is matched with another opportunist, so the immediate return is zero and the agent gets the discounted utility of
11

To see this, note that in each period, there is a probability of φ of implementing the idea, and
2
with φ the idea gets carried into the next period. Thus P rob(implementation) = φ+φφ+φ φ+... =
Pj=∞ j
φ
φ j=0 φ =
= 1.
1−φ
12
The comparative statics are simple: this probability is strictly increasing in the ease of finding
a match φ. Thus idea generation is most rewarding in an environment where there is a good chance
of finding a complementor.

9
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being an opportunist (or a generator) next period. The second term reflects the case
where the O agent is matched with an idea-bearer and there is a fit, so that the agent
z
gets and then comes back next period as an opportunist. The third term reflects the
2
case where the agent is matched with an idea-bearer but there is no fit. The two flip
an even coin, so that with probability one half the agent goes back without an idea,
and with probability one half the agent steals the idea and becomes an idea-bearer
next period.
The utility of an idea-bearer is independent of whether the idea has been self
generated or stolen, and is given by
z
1
1
z 1
1
2
UI = θ[φ( +δUO )+φ( δUO + δUI )]+θ[φ2 (z+δUO )+2φφ( + δUO + δUI )+φ δUI ]
2
2
2
2 2
2
The first term reflects the case where the agent is matched with an opportunist. With
probability φ there is a fit and the pair implement the agent’s idea, after which the
next expected period payoﬀ equals δUO . If there is no fit, with probability one half
the agent retains the idea for the next period, while with probability one half the
opportunist takes away the idea. The second bracket term reflects the case where
two idea-bearers are matched. When both ideas fit, each agent gets z. When only
z
one fits, the payoﬀ is plus a half chance to take the idea further as before. If neither
2
idea fits each agent carries his idea forward.
The utility of a generator is given by
UG = δUI − ψ
which equals its expected payoﬀ of an idea-bearer next period, minus the cost of
developing the idea. Note the obvious point that UG < UI , as it is more profitable to
seek to develop a stolen idea than to incur some generation cost to produce it.
It is useful to define
∆ = UI − UO
so that ∆ measures the net benefit of having an idea. ∆ will play an important role
throughout the analysis, as it provides a natural metric for the value of being an
idea-bearer.

10
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2.5

Social eﬃciency

Before stating the main Proposition on the market equilibrium, we characterize the
socially eﬃcient benchmark, defined as the allocation that maximizes the sum of
utilities of all agents. We denote it by the superscript S.
Proposition 1 (Social eﬃciency)
φz + ψ
δφz
and ψS =
.
Define ∆S =
1 + δφ
1 − δ + δφ
The socially eﬃcient equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) If ψ ≥ ψS , then it is socially eﬃcient not to generate any ideas.
(ii) If ψ < ψ S , then the optimal allocation has no opportunists, so that nO = 0 and
θ = 1. Irrespective of how the idea value z is split, utilities are given by
UGS =

δ∆S − ψ
∆S − ψ
and UIS =
.
1−δ
1−δ

Proposition 1 states that it is socially optimal not to have any opportunists. The
intuition is simple. When an idea-bearer is matched with an opportunist, he gets the
same expected feedback, but as the opportunist has no valid idea, he cannot provide
any useful feedback. It is therefore always more eﬃcient to match an idea-bearer with
another idea-bearer. All agents without ideas should generate new ones.

2.6

Equilibrium rewards to invention and elaboration

Generators need to achieve a non-negative utility by creating an idea, i.e., UG ≥ 0.
Any agent without an idea will choose between generating an idea versus listening
to others’, which implies UG (θ) = UO (θ). This indiﬀerence condition drives the
density of ideas, as measured by θ. We denote variables associated with the market
equilibrium by the superscript M.
Proposition 2 (Market equilibrium)
φz
and ψM ≡ δ∆.
Define ∆ =
2 − δ + φδ
The market equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) If ψ ≥ ψM , then no ideas are generated in the market.
(ii) If ψ < ψ M , then the equilibrium fraction of idea-bearers is given
θ=δ−

ψ
<1
∆

11
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and utilities are given by
UG = UO =

θ∆
∆−ψ
δ∆ − ψ
=
and UI =
.
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ

(iii) In comparison to the socially eﬃcient outcome, the market equilibrium has a
S
smaller feasible range (i.e., ψM < ψS ), fewer generators (nM
G < nG ), fewer ideaS
M
S
bearers (nM
I < nI ), more opportunists (nO > nO = 0), a lower utility for generators
(UG < UGS ), and a lower utility for idea-bearers (UI < UIS ).
Proposition 2 shows how in a pure market setting, idea generation occurs for lower
generation costs than the socially optimal ψS , so for any ψ ∈ [ψM , ψS ), idea generation
would be socially desirable, yet it cannot be achieved in a market exchange. Even
if idea generation is feasible in the market, its equilibrium return is ineﬃcient since
agents can participate in elaborating ideas without contributing any. The market
equilibrium always contains less idea-bearers than optimal, i.e., θ < 1. To see that
the utility of generating ideas is lower than the socially desirable level we then note
from Propositions 1 and 2 that ∆ < ∆S , implying that the premium for having an
idea in the market is too low relative to the social optimum.
The comparative statics are as follows.

Corollary to Proposition 2: Comparative statics of market equilibrium
Consider the market equilibrium with ψ < ψ M .
(i) The equilibrium number of generators (nM
G ) is increasing in z and φ, and decreasing
in ψ.
(ii) The equilibrium number of opportunists (nM
O ) is decreasing in z and φ, and
increasing in ψ.
(iii) The equilibrium number of idea-bearers (nM
I ) is increasing in z, and decreasing
in ψ. It is also increasing in φ for larger values of ψ, but decreasing in φ for smaller
values of ψ.
(iv) The utilities UG , UI and UO are all increasing in z and φ, and decreasing in ψ.

These results are quite intuitive, as the number of opportunists responds to economic variables in exactly the opposite way as the number of generators. The more
12
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attractive it is to generate ideas, the fewer agents seek to only listen to other agents’
ideas. The more subtle result concerns φ, the probability of fit. A higher likelihood
of fit encourages ideas generation, but also increases the expected speed at which
ideas get implemented. Higher values of φ are thus associated with more ‘new’ but
fewer ‘old’ ideas. The net eﬀect can go either way. The appendix shows that there
exists a critical value ψφ ∈ (0, ψM ) such that the ‘new’ idea eﬀect dominates the
‘old’ idea eﬀect if and only if ψ > ψ φ . Finally, note that in equilibrium the utility
of opportunists - unlike the number of opportunists - remains equal to the utility of
generators.

2.7

Equilibrium with perfect idea protection

The analysis so far rules out the protection of ideas via NDAs. We now examine
NDAs in two steps. This subsection assumes that it is feasible to protect an idea by
inducing a counterpart to sign an NDA. We thus derive the market equilibrium with
NDAs. In section 2.8 we then derive under what circumstances NDAs are actually
adopted in equilibrium.
An agent who seeks to protect his idea is termed the “issuer” of the NDA, and the
agent who agrees not to steal the idea is the “signee” of the NDA. We assume that
matched partners either agree to sign mutual NDAs, so that each agent becomes both
an issuer and a signee, or neither does. If an agent turns out to be an opportunist,
issuing a NDA is useless but is harmless. Each agent incurs an arbitrarily small
transaction cost c > 0 every time he agrees to a mutual NDA. Our analysis does not
rely on large transaction c, whose role is merely to break an indiﬀerence condition.
If NDAs are signed by all, any inventor keeps his idea until implementation. This
increases his bargaining power in case of a fit. Interestingly, the NDA protects the
inventor’s claim on the idea, but does not grant him the full return to his idea. The
complementor has some bargaining power, since his skills are required for implementation and seeking another one would imply a delay and thus a lower discounted
value.
Let the superscript N denote variables associated with the NDA equilibrium. To
derive the Nash bargaining solution, let s be the profit share of the idea-bearer.
Consider the case where A has an idea that fits, and B is an opportunist without
ideas (the appendix shows that all other cases follow a similar logic). The value of

13
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cooperation is z, with continuation utilities δUON for A and B. A’s outside option is to
take the idea back into the market next period, which gives him a continuation value
δUIN . B cannot steal the idea, so his outside option is δUON . The Nash bargaining
solution therefore implies that A’s utility is given by
1
1 δ∆N
sz + δUON = [z + 2δUON + δUIN − δUON ] ⇔ s = +
2
2
2z
The idea-bearer retains more than half of the idea value, which is an improvement
over the no contract outcome. The exact value retained depends on (endogenous)
diﬀerence in utilities ∆N = UI − UO . The appendix shows that s < 1, so that the
idea-bearer still does not capture the entire value of the idea.13
The appendix derives the market equilibrium when all agents sign NDAs, summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (NDA equilibrium)
φz
Define ∆N =
, ψN ≡ δ∆N and ψO ≡ Max[0, c + (2δ − 1)∆N ].
2 − 2δ + δφ
The NDA equilibrium has the following characteristics:
(i) If ψ > ψ N , then no ideas are generated in a market with NDAs.
(ii) If ψO < ψ ≤ ψN , then the NDA equilibrium has a positive fraction of opportunists.
The equilibrium fraction of idea-bearers is given by
θN =

2 δ∆N − (ψ − c)
<1
φ z − δ∆N

Agent’s utilities are given by
UGN = UON =

δ∆N − ψ
∆N − ψ
and UIN =
.
1−δ
1−δ

(iii) If ψ ≤ ψO , then the NDA equilibrium has no opportunists, so that the equilibrium
fraction of idea-bearers is given by θ = 1. The equilibrium is the same as the socially
13
Could an idea-bearer do even better by asking the counterpart to accept a contract even more
onerous than an NDA, such as a contract that gives the idea bearer all of the surplus (i.e., s = 1)?
The problem is that such contracts would not be renegotiation-proof. Before agreeing to cooperate,
the complementor can always renegotiate terms. The renegotiation bargaining game is identical to
the one described above - it is easy to see that the joint value and the outside options are identical
- implying that the outcome after renegotiation is the same as above. Hence there is no loss of
generality limiting our analysis to NDA contracts.
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eﬃcient equilibrium, except for the transaction costs, so that we replace ∆S with
φz + ψ − c
∆Sc =
.
1 + δφ
(iv) The range of the NDA equilibrium lies in between the simple market equilibrium
and the socially eﬃcient equilibrium, i.e., ψM < ψN < ψS .
(v) For ψO < ψ ≤ ψN , the are more generators than in the market equilibrium, but
S
fewer than in the socially eﬃcient equilibrium (nG < nN
G < nG ). Same for idea-bearers
N
S
(nM
I < nI < nI ). There are fewer opportunists than in the market equilibrium, but
N
S
more than in the socially eﬃcient equilibrium (nM
O > nO > nO = 0). The utilities
are higher than in the pure market equilibrium, but lower than in the socially eﬃcient
equilibrium (UG < UGN < UGS and UI < UIN < UIS ).
Proposition 3 shows that NDAs improve over the pure market outcome as they
help idea generators to capture a larger fraction of the value they generate. This
is reflected in the fact that ∆N > ∆, which shows that the net benefit of having
an idea is higher when ideas are protected. For intermediate values of ψ (i.e., ψ ∈
(ψO , ψN )) the equilibrium is more eﬃcient than the market equilibrium, but still not
socially optimal, as opportunistic incentives to to elaborate rather than generate ideas
continue to exist. Only for suﬃciently low values of ψ (i.e., ψ < ψ O ) we find that idea
generation always dominates the opportunist strategy. In this case, the equilibrium
is eﬃcient, except for transaction costs.

2.8

Are NDAs used in equilibrium?

The analysis of section 2.7 assumes that NDAs are signed by all agents. This section
examines under what conditions NDAs will actually be used in equilibrium. Our goal
is to address a puzzle. Casual empirical observation suggests that NDAs are used
very rarely by agents actively involved with new ideas. Even to the limited extent
NDAs are employed, they are rarely used at the initial stages of exchanging ideas.
Why are NDAs used so rarely by agents who share innovative ideas? Asking for
an NDA seems always beneficial for the issuer, the question is why the other party
should sign it? Prior literature suggests that informational imperfections and the
possibility of extortion limit the use of NDAs (see, in particular, Anton and Yao,
2002, 2004, 2005). We oﬀer a parsimonious explanation for why agents may refuse to
sign NDAs, namely that doing so may be suboptimal.

15
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The NDA contracting game occurs when neither agent knows whether the other
actually has an idea. We assume symmetric agents would sign an NDA only if the
other also agrees to sign one - we return to this assumption at the end of the section.
Whether two agents choose to sign a mutual NDA depends on expectations about
subsequent behavior. To examine out-of-equilibrium beliefs of agents, we use the
intuitive criterion of Cho-Kreps (1987).
The stage game proceeds as follows. Let agent A propose a mutual NDA, and
agent B either accepts or reject. Agents then decide whether to disclose their ideas. If
there is a fit, the two negotiate the terms of cooperation, else they negotiate who will
take the idea further. The behavior at the contracting stage is influenced by expectations over whether or not disclosure occurs subsequent to a refusal to sign. There
may be multiple equilibria supported by diﬀerent beliefs about ex-post disclosure.
We first establish the existence of an equilibrium where nobody signs NDAs. The
key insight is that agents can never credibly commit to refuse disclosing their idea
without a NDA. Intuitively, agents still want to disclose their ideas, even if their
match refused to sign an NDA. This is a self-fulling equilibrium, because everyone
expect same situation next period.14
Consider, starting from an equilibrium where no one uses NDAs, whether introducing NDAs constitutes a profitable deviation. The appendix shows that disclosure
happens even without an NDA. Signing an NDA therefore does not aﬀect the actual
exchange of ideas or value created. However, it aﬀects the division of rents between
the two agents. This insight implies that using NDAs is a zero-sum game. In fact,
in the presence of transaction costs, using NDAs is a negative-sum game.15 That is
why introducing NDAs does not constitute a profitable deviation.
Proposition 4 (Existence of equilibrium without NDAs)
There always exists an equilibrium in which agents never sign NDAs, and the equilibrium is the market equilibrium as described in Proposition 2.
14

The appendix shows that an agent cannot commit not to disclose even when he knows that
the other agent is an opportunist. The reason is that, in equilibrium, there are always enough
opportunists (i.e., θ is suﬃciently low), so that sharing an idea with a known opportunist in the
current period is no worse than sharing an idea with an agent that is an opportunist with probability
θ in the next period. This result holds for all values of δ.
15
Assuming a small transaction cost seems reasonable. However, the result continues to hold even
for c = 0, except that idea-bearers are now indiﬀerent about signing NDAs. The model with c = 0
thus has knife-edge properties. Hence our focus on the model with c > 0.
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To sketch the proof, note that if agents disclose ideas with or without NDAs, then
NDAs either do nothing (when both or neither has an idea), or they transfer utility
from one agent to another. Specifically, if both agents are idea-bearers, then NDAs
cancel out each other. Similarly, if both are opportunists, then NDAs are irrelevant.
If, however, one agent is an idea-bearer and the other an opportunist, then an NDA
has the eﬀect of transferring utility from the opportunists to the idea-bearer. Having
established that NDAs do not create value, consider now an equilibrium where nobody
signs NDAs and examine whether a deviation where A proposes using mutual NDAs
breaks the equilibrium. B uses the intuitive criterion to make an inference about A’s
type. Clearly A cannot be an opportunist, since an O type can never benefit from
an NDA. B would thus believe that A is an idea-bearer. What is B’s best response?
If B is an opportunist, he would be worse oﬀ accepting the NDA. However, even if
B is an idea-bearer, he would still refuse to sign the NDA, because the two NDAs
cancel out each other. So it is never worthwhile to incur the transactions c to write
up NDAs that have no economic benefit. It follows that, starting from an equilibrium
without NDAs, the deviation of oﬀering NDA is always met with a negative response.
Moreover, the appendix shows that A cannot commit not to disclose the idea even
after B refuses the NDA. Thus A’s deviation to introduce an NDAs is not worthwhile.
Proposition 4 deals with a situation where no one uses NDAs, and shows that
this is a stable equilibrium. This still leaves open to possibility that there is another
equilibrium where NDAs are used. Intuitively, the equilibrium with NDAs is selfenforcing as long as agents refuse to disclose their ideas without an NDA. The key
issue is thus whether refusing to disclose an idea without NDA is credible.
In the appendix we show that the refusal to disclose is not credible in many
circumstances. Consider a deviation from the NDA equilibrium, where one agent,
call him A, refuses to sign the NDA. We derive a condition of when B would still
want to disclose his idea. Using the intuitive criterion, we show that B would not
update his belief about A after an NDA rejection, because both idea-bearers and
opportunists prefer not to sign NDAs. Whenever B’s initial belief of having met an
idea-bearer is suﬃciently high (i.e., θN is suﬃciently high), he still prefers to discloses
the idea, even after an NDA rejection. This, however, makes A’s deviation of refusing
to sign the NDA profitable, implying that the equilibrium where all agents sign NDAs
cannot be sustained. The key condition for an NDA equilibrium to be stable is thus
that the fraction of idea-bearers is not too high. Proposition 3 showed that for any
17
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ψ < ψ O , the NDA equilibrium is eﬃcient and has no opportunists, i.e., θN = 1.
We thus note that this equilibrium can never be sustained, because agents can never
commit not to disclose their ideas. For the range ψO < ψ < ψ N we have θN < 1.
The appendix derives a simple condition for when the refusal to disclose is credible
in this range. Formally we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 (Existence of equilibrium with NDAs)
The equilibrium where all agents sign NDAs described in Proposition 3 is not sus2
2
b where ψ
b = c+
> δ and ψ < ψ
tainable if θN > 3 − , or equivalently, if
δ
3
2 − 5δ + 4δ 2 N
∆ > ψO .
δ
Proposition 5 is an important and perhaps surprising result. It says that NDA
contracts can arise endogenously only under limited circumstances. For a large range
of parameters, using NDA is simply not an equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to
Proposition 4 which showed that the equilibrium without NDAs is always stable.
The condition for when NDAs can be used in equilibrium can be expressed in two
2
ways. The condition θN < 3 − indicates that the rate of idea generation cannot
δ
be too high, or else there are too few opportunists in equilibrium to make the refusal
to disclose an idea credible. Put diﬀerently, when ideas are plentiful the expected
payoﬀ to share an unprotected idea is high, so agents do not bother to demand costly
NDAs. Since θN is endogenous, we restate the condition exogenously in terms of
b which also requires 2 < δ < 1. So NDAs can be used only when there are
ψ > ψ,
3
fewer ideas in circulation and the cost of generating them is suﬃciently high, so that
agents become averse to disclose their ideas without an NDA.
The analysis so far is based on the adoption of a mutual NDA. Would anything
change if we allow for unilateral NDAs? Mutual NDAs clearly require no transfer
payments. In order to be willing to sign a unilateral NDA, it is conceivable that the
NDA signee would require a payment from the NDA issuer. Such arrangements are
hardly ever observed in practice. Reassuringly, our model also predicts that such
arrangements would never be used in equilibrium. The proof is in the appendix, we
briefly sketch the main intuition. Proposition 4 continues to hold, because of the
central insight that, starting from a equilibrium without NDAs, introducing NDAs is
a negative-sum game. While it is possible for one agent to design a unilateral NDA
such that only idea-bearers would sign it, doing so is ultimately futile: the NDA
18
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doesn’t increase the joint utility, and oﬀering ends up costing the issuer more than
he can benefit from it. For Proposition 5, unilateral NDAs with side payments are
unnecessary whenever the NDA equilibrium exists, nor do they aﬀect the logic of how
a refusal to sign the NDA breaks the equilibrium.
Our analysis identifies one important reason why agents involved in frequent idea
exchange do not sign NDAs: they become unnecessary when agents cannot commit
not to disclose their ideas anyway, which occurs when ideas are suﬃciently abundant.16
Next to contracts, agents can create a commitment to idea protection through
reputation. The ability to create a reputation for not stealing ideas depends on the
visibility of one’s action. We consider next the possibility that an agent invests in
creating a visible environment among multiple agents. In principle there may be
multiple institutional arrangements that are supported by reputation mechanism.
Individuals may acquire a reputation, possible within some network structure, and
organizations may be the repositories of a collective reputation. We will not attempt
to provide a comprehensive characterization of all reputation mechanisms, but instead
focus on one important reputation mechanism, namely the firm (Kreps, 1986). This
allows us to link our analysis to the larger economic debate about the relative roles
of markets versus firms (Hart, 1995, Williamson, 1975).

3
3.1

Idea circulation with firms
The firm as a local reputation mechanism

The value of a reputation depends on the number of agents able to observe such
an opportunistic action, and whether they would choose to punish the deviation.
Clearly, a ‘global’ reputation could resolve idea stealing in our model, if it would imply
exclusion from any future idea exchange with anyone. Realistically, most actions are
visible only among a few agents directly or indirectly involved. Firms may be seen as
governance mechanisms to overcome individual opportunism. We propose to think of
firms as having ‘local’ transparency among a finite set of agents that we call employees,
reflecting a natural information distinction between insiders and outsiders.
16

Obviously there may be other reasons not modelled here for why NDAs are not used, such as
the risk that an NDA could be used to extort rents even if no true violation of the NDA occurred.
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Firms make use of a diﬀerent legal arrangement than NDAs to protect against idea
stealing, namely trade secret law. Whereas NDAs pertain to transactions among unrelated parties, and are relatively rarely used in practice, trade secret law automatically
bind parties related through employment contracts. Agents accepting employment
commit not to take ideas out of the firms, so that the firm defines a legal boundary
for the circulation of internal ideas. As a result, once the idea is recorded as a firm
initiative, employees can exchange their ideas without the risk of theft. Naturally,
this requires that the firm monitors its boundaries, which may be costly (Liebeskind,
1997, Chou, 2007).
We model the firm as an enabler of idea circulation among a finite set of agents.
The firm claims ownership on all internally generated ideas. Since employees’ ideas are
unobservable until reported, the firm needs to provide appropriate incentives for idea
disclosure, and to protect them within its own boundaries, pursuing any idea theft.
The reward is credible only if the firm owner would lose more from taking advantage
by using ideas without adequately compensating their generators. Visibility enables
to develop a local reputation, where insiders trust the reputed agent until proven
wrong (Kreps, 1986). Thus a reputation may be upheld in an infinite game of perfect
certainty as long as the firm adequately rewards its employees, else they all leave and
the firm loses all value.
Naturally, creating a reputation is costly. We assume that a firm owner needs
to make a large sunk investment to establish a process by which her actions are
visible to a finite set of agents. To define this choice, we assume free entry and an
upward-sloping supply curve of firms. Specifically, the j th entrant faces a sunk fixed
cost Kj , where Kj is distributed according to a cumulative distribution Ω(Kj ) with
density ω(Kj ) over the range Kj ∈ [Kmin , K max ]. Kj here reflects the sunk expense
to establish a firm, which includes the cost of creating visibility, plus other fixed costs
that are increasing in the number of firms.17
We assume that transparency of actions can only be achieved with a finite set of
agents, the size of which we denote by E. Formally, the investment Kj allows the
firm owner to establish a reputation among E agents. The firm owner hires these
agents as employees. We assume that E is large but finite, and for tractability treat
it as exogenous.18 Once an owner commits to managing a firm, she no longer can
17
18

This assumption reflects some scarce resource, such as increasing location costs.
In principle we could allow for the possibility that larger investments create transparency among
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generate or complement ideas.
Suppose the firm’s reputation depends on maintaining a promise to reward idea
generators with an amount bz for each idea originated and implemented internally.
The reputation condition ensures that firm owners prefer to maintain their reputation
over a deviation where the owner lets employees implement their ideas but refuses to
pay any bonus. The maximal deviation payoﬀ would occur in the rare event when
all E had completed ideas at the same time. Not paying them would give the owner
a deviation value of Ebz. After that the owner earns the normal agent return of UO .
So the reputation condition is as follows
Ebz + UO < δΠ
Later we derive the equilibrium value of the firm and formally prove this condition
is always satisfied for δ suﬃciently close to 1. This is a standard result, since the
benefits of losing a reputation on the left hand side are bounded, whereas the benefits
of keeping a reputation on the right had side is increasing in δ. For the remainder of
the analysis we assume that this condition is satisfied.

3.2

Idea circulation within firms

To establish a claim on an idea, upon its disclosure by its inventor it is “recorded”
as an internal project, in a verifiable form. Thus “bureaucratic procedures” and a
“paper trail” are essential for the internal reward system, and for internal ideas to be
covered by trade secret laws. We assume that firms can always prevent idea stealing
by threatening legal action. Once an idea is reported, the generator is assigned
the task to implement it via internal matching. In managerial terms, he becomes
an “internal project champion” or an “intrapreneur.” Since no employee can leak
the idea outside the firm, the generator can count on cooperation from all internal
listeners. The firm uses an internal rotation system that corresponds to the random
matching in markets. For simplicity we assume that the firm can avoid matching
repeatedly two agents who didn’t find a fit on their first match. Employees may leave
the firm at will, but they need permission from the firm to pursue any reported idea.
a larger set of agent, so that E would be an increasing function of Kj . This would endogenize size
of firm boundaries. In an earlier version, Hellmann and Perotti (2005) we allow for this, but note
that this extension adds complexity without oﬀering additional insight.
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To make the analysis of the firm tractable and comparable to the market outcome,
we assume that the chance of finding a complementor is the same, given by φ, and
focus on the steady state number of ideas circulating and matched within the firm.
The major diﬀerence is that a firm will fail to complete all ideas internally. The
next subsection shows that if there is no internal fit, then it is optimal to allow idea
generators to pursue their ideas outside the firm.19
In principle a finite-sized firm would have some fluctuations in idea completion.
For analytical tractability our analysis focuses only on the steady-state properties of
firms. For large E, any deviations from the steady state become negligible.
Let F be the number of agents that an idea-bearer talks to within a firm. This
is a function of firm size E and rate of completion φ, i.e., F = F (E, φ). While there
is no explicit solution, the appendix derives the implicit fixed point equation that
defines F . It also shows that dF/dE > 0 - in larger firms there are more employees
to talk to - and provides a suﬃcient condition for dF/dφ < 0 - if finding an internal
fit is easy, there is less turnover in the firm, and thus fewer new employees to talk
F
to. The probability that an idea finds no match inside the firm is given by φ , so the
F
probability of internal completion is 1 − φ .

3.3

Optimal firm policies

In this section we derive a firm’s optimal actions. It is useful to define
e=
φ

j=F
X
j=1

j j−1

δφ

b=
,φ

j=F
X

j−1

φ

j=1

Consider first the firm’s compensation decision. Let UE,j be the utility of an
idea-bearing employee talking to his j th internal match. For any j = 1, ..., F , we have
UE,j = φ(bz +δUE )+φδUE,j+1 . Moreover, UE,F +1 = UI , so that if the employee didn’t
find a fit after F internal matches, he leaves the firm and becomes an idea-bearer in
the market. Since each agent has to first generate an idea, the ex-ante utility of
joining a firm is given by UE = −ψ + δUE,1 .
Firm profits are the sum of its profits per employee position, i.e., Π = EUF , where
UF is the firm’s lifetime profit from one employee’s position (where the position is
19

Realistically, we assume that firms allows registered ideas to be pursued as new ventures, but
not within established competitors. As a result, market participants benefit from ideas leaving firms,
a well established fact.
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refilled every time an employee leaves). UF behaves very similarly to UE above,
namely UF = δUF,1 , UF,j = φ(bz + δUF ) + φδUF,j+1 , and UE,F +1 = UF .
Consider now the entry decision. Let Π denote firm profitability, which is assumed
to be equal for all firms. Free entry implies that agents will create firms until the
marginal benefit equals their outside opportunity cost, i.e., until Π − Kj ≥ UO . In
equilibrium, the number of firms is thus given by nF = Ω(Π − UO ). The fraction of
agents working in firms as employees is given by nE = EnF .
Firms are never viable if the entry cost of the first entrant, given by Kmin , is
very high, nor if the cost of generating ideas ψ is too high. We denote ψF as the
highest value for which there can be idea creation within firms. To focus on the
most interesting part of the model, we assume that Kmin is suﬃciently small so that
there exists a range of values ψ ∈ (ψM , ψF ) where firms can generate ideas and
[
market cannot. The appendix formally derives an upper bound K
min > 0, so that
(1
−
δ)Kmin 20
F F +1
F
M
F
e +φ δ
[
Kmin < K
.
> ψ where ψ = φφz
∆−
Note
min ⇔ ψ
E
F
also that the upper bound ψ is smaller than the socially eﬃcient upper bound ψS ,
because firms cannot capture the full value of idea generation.
The following Proposition establishes the properties of the firm’s optimal compensation policies.
Proposition 6 (i) It is optimal for the firm to allow idea generators who could not
complete an idea to seek to complete it outside the firm.
(ii) The firm’s optimal compensation for generators that satisfies the ex-ante participation constraint, and that provides incentives for idea generation, is given by
F

ψ + θ∆ − φ δ F +1 ∆
.
b=
e
φφz

(iii) The firm’s optimal compensation ensures that employees always have an incentive
to disclose their ideas, rather than leaving the firm without reporting them.
◦ If ψ < ψ M then UE = UG = UO and UE,j = UI ∀ j = 1, ..., J.
◦ If ψ ∈ [ψM , ψF ) then UE = UO and UE,j > UI ∀ j = 1, ..., J.
[
For Kmin > K
min , firms may still be viable, but only over a smaller range of ψ than markets,
i.e., ψ F < ψ M . This is a straightforward extension to our main model, so we leave the details to be
worked out by the interested reader.
20
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(iv) The firm’s profits per employee are given by
e
e + φF δ F +1 ∆ − ψ
φφbz
φφz
e
e
= U − UO where U =
Π/E = UF =
1−δ
1−δ
(v) The fraction of employees who generate ideas is given by fG =
fraction who circulate ideas is given by fI =

b
φ

b
1+φ

.

1
b
1+φ

, and the

Proposition 6 explains how the firm chooses its optimal compensation. It is always
optimal to give a departing employee all the rents from his idea. The intuition is that if
the firm wanted to take a stake in the employee’s spin-oﬀ it would have to increase its
ex-ante compensation by an equivalent amount. To satisfy the ex-ante participation
constraint, an employee needs to receive a utility comparable to what he could obtain
in the market as an opportunist. The firm therefore sets b so that UE = UO , resulting
in the expression above. Part (iii) verifies that this level of compensation ensures
that an idea generator always has an incentive to disclose his idea within the firm,
rather than leave. It shows that this incentive constraint is satisfied with equality
whenever ψ < ψ M , and has some slack for ψ ∈ [ψM , ψF ). Note also that the firm
does not compensate complementors, because it ensures that employees cannot take
reported ideas elsewhere: giving feedback to colleagues’ ideas therefore becomes part
of the job.
Part (iv) expresses the firms steady state profits, which are the discounted value
e
This can be reof the expected per-period profits after paying out bonuses (φφbz).
e minus
expressed as the total value of ideas implemented in the firm (denoted by U),
the employees opportunity costs UO . The firm’s profits are negatively aﬀected by the
return to opportunism in the market. Note that the compensation and firm value
depend on properties of the market equilibrium, and in particular θ, the fraction of
opportunists in the market. We examine this in the next subsection.
Part (v) derives the steady-state task allocation within the firm. We denote the
fraction of generators by fG and the fraction of idea-bearers by fI . The fraction
of generators fG is technologically determined, and does not depend on the market
equilibrium payoﬀ. It is increasing in φ: if implementation of ideas is easier, there is
relatively more time to generate ideas.
24
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The optimal policy described in Proposition 6 assumes that employees trust the
firm owner. We now turn to the questions of how the firm owner can maintain a
reputation. We have already seen that the maximal deviation is given by Ebz, so we
simply state the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 A firm’s reputation is sustainable forever if
´
³
e
Ebz + δUO < δΠ = δE U − UO .

(1)

This condition is always satisfied for δ suﬃciently close to 1.
The condition for sustaining a reputational equilibrium is satisfied for δ suﬃciently
close to 1, where the gains from a one-time deviation fall short of discounted profits,
the benefit of maintaining the firm’s reputation value.

3.4

Coexistence of firms and markets when only firms generate ideas

We now examine the full equilibrium where firms and markets interact. In the model,
agents either belong to the firm sector, where they can be firm owners or employees
that either generate or circulate ideas. Or they belong to the market sector, where
they can either generate ideas or participate in the circulation of ideas. At the end
of each period, agents can change sector: employees can leave their firm, and market
agents can chose to become employees. The fraction of employees leaving the firm
F
sector at the end of each period is given by φ fI , i.e., this is the fraction of ideabearers who did not find an internal match. The total number of employees leaving
F
firms is thus given by nE φ fI .
Consider first the case where markets fail to generate ideas, i.e., where ψ > ψ M .
Under these circumstances, firms are necessary to create a protected environment
for idea generation. Because employees can leave firms and match with other agents
outside of firms, the market still plays an important role for the circulation of ideas.
We now analyze a coexistence equilibrium, where all ideas are created inside firms,
but markets play a role circulating and elaborating ideas.
Because departing employees are the only idea-generators, the density of ideas in
F
F
b
nE φ φ
nE φ fI
=
. Using
the market (the fraction of idea-bearers) is given by nI =
b
φ
φ 1+φ
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nF + nE + nI + nO = 1, straightforward calculations reveal that
F
b
φ
EnF
φ
θ=
.
b
1 − (E + 1)nF φ 1 + φ

Naturally, the higher is the density of firms, the higher the fraction of idea-bearers
in the market. In this case the utility of being an opportunist in the market, given
∆
, which can be expressed as
by UO = θ
1−δ
F
b
φ
∆
EnF
φ
UO =
b1−δ
1 − (E + 1)nF φ 1 + φ

(2)

We call this the market equation (M), it expresses the utility of market agents as
a function of the firm density nF . Figure 1 graphically depicts this equation, showing how the market utility (on the vertical axis) changes with firm density (on the
horizontal axis). The following summarizes the key properties of the M curve
Market equilibrium (part 1): For ψ ∈ [ψM , ψF ], the M curve is upward
sloping, i.e., UO is increasing in nF . For a given nF , UO is increasing in z, and
independent of ψ.

Clearly, the utility of independent agents increases with the number of firms. More
firms means that more ideas leak out into the market, increasing the likelihood that
an opportunist encounters an idea to either implement or steal.
The comparative statics of UO are quite diﬀerent from the corollary to Proposition
2, since now the market payoﬀ is no longer determined by the indiﬀerence condition
with generators (UO = UG ), but depends solely on ideas escaping from firms. Indeed,
as shown above, UO is independent of generation costs (for given nF ), reflecting that
ideas are now generated inside firms.21
Next we consider firm density. The firm’s entry condition is given by
e − (E + 1)UO )
nF = Ω(EUF − UO ) = Ω(E U

(3)

21
The comparative static with respect to φ is ambiguous and not analytically tractable, because
of the dependence of F on φ.
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We call this the firm equation (F), it expresses the firm density nF as a function
of market utility UO , also depicted in Figure 1. Fundamentally, the F curve is a
measure of firm profitability, which under free entry determines the number of firms.
The following summarizes its key properties.

Firm equilibrium: The F curve is downwards sloping, i.e., nF is decreasing in
UO . For a given UO , nF is increasing in z but decreasing in ψ.

The main insight is that a higher utility for market agents increases the firm’s
employment costs and thus reduces the density of firms.22 The number of firms is
higher when ideas are more valuable (higher z) and generation costs cheaper (lower
ψ).
Since the M is upward sloping and the F curve downward sloping, there exists
a unique equilibrium. We are now in a position to fully characterize the equilibrium
and its comparative statics.
Proposition 8 (i) For ψ ∈ [ψM , ψF ) there exists an equilibrium such that all ideas
F
are generated inside firms, but a fraction φ is implemented in the market.
(ii) The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the M and F curves. The
comparative statics are as follows
◦ An increase in ψ decreases UO and nF
◦ An increase in z increases UO , and also increases nF provided nF is not too large.
For ψ ∈ [ψM , ψF ) firms enter and hire employees to generate ideas, while market
agents wait for spin-oﬀ ideas which cannot find an internal fit in their firms. The
equilibrium of Proposition 8 occurs at the intersection of the M and F curves. Figure
2 shows that higher generation costs ψ always decrease the number of firms, as well
as the utility of market agents. This can be seen from the fact that only the F curve
depends on ψ.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of increasing the value of ideas z. The utility of market agents is always increased, but the eﬀect on the density of firms is ambiguous.
22

Note that while it is individually rational for a firm to allow uncompleted ideas to leave, in the
aggregate this increases the reward to opportunism in the market, and thus the firm cost to reward
internal ideas for all firms.

27

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper436

28

Hellman and Perotti: The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets

Intuitively, a higher value of ideas should increase firm profits and thus increase the
density of firms nF , as reflected in the outward shift of the F curve. However, a
higher value of ideas also increases the utility of market agents, and thus the cost
of hiring employees, as represented by the upward shift of the M curve. The net
of these two eﬀects is ambiguous. In the appendix we show how for suﬃciently low
values of nF (when the distribution Ω puts suﬃcient weight on higher values of K)
the net eﬀect is always positive.

3.5

Coexistence when both firm and market generate ideas

When ψ < ψ M , idea generation in markets is feasible. Is there still an opportunity for
firms to organize a parallel process of generating and circulating ideas? The answer
is yes, because the market still allows for idea stealing, thus implicitly rewarding opportunism. Firms can ensure a safer return to idea generation, and thus increase idea
generation overall. However, ideas leaving firms increase the return to opportunism,
which reduces the rate of idea generation by market agents.
The new equilibrium is similar to the one discussed in section 3.4., except that
ideas are now generated both in firms and markets. The F curve is the same as in
section 3.4, but the M equation is diﬀerent. In fact, the results from Propositions 2
and its corollary apply once again, which aﬀects the M curve as follows:
Market equilibrium (part 2): For ψ < ψ M , the M curve is entirely flat, i.e.,
UO is independent of nF . UO is increasing in z, and decreasing in ψ.

For ψ < ψ M , the M curve no longer depends on the density of firms nF . The key
intuition is that once ideas are generated in the market, the utility of market agents
no longer depends on firms, but regains its own dynamics, as described in Proposition
2 and its corollary. We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium and its
comparative statics.
Proposition 9 (i) For ψ < ψ M there exists an equilibrium such that ideas are generated both inside firms and in the market. The equilibrium is determined by the
intersection of the flat M and the downwards sloping F curves. The comparative
statics are as follows
28

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

29

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 436 [2010]

◦ An increase in ψ decreases UO but increases nF .
◦ An increase in z increases UO and nF .
Proposition 9 diﬀers from Proposition 8, because in Proposition 9 market idea
generation directly competes with idea generation inside firms. The reason that firms
continue to exist, even when markets generate ideas, is that firms can solve some of
the ineﬃciencies that occur in the market. Specifically, firms can provide incentives
to their employees that discourage idea stealing and opportunism. This ensures that
within firms all employees only generate and circulate their own ideas. However, firms
can only provide a limited number of employee interactions, so that some employees
leave with their ideas. In equilibrium, the strengths of market interactions, oﬀering
unlimited matching opportunities, thus augments the strengths of firms.
The most surprising part of Proposition 9 is that the firm density nF is actually
increasing in ψ. The intuition is that higher generation costs discourage idea creation
in both firms and markets, but that markets are more aﬀected because of the stealing
problem.
Figure 4 integrates insights from Proposition 8 and 9, showing how the number
of firms (nF ) depends on idea generation costs (ψ) across the entire parameter range.
For low values of ψ, the number of firms is increasing in ψ, as shown in Proposition
9. Figure 4 shows that idea generation in the market declines rapidly with ψ. This
means that the relative importance firms actually increases, allowing for the density
of firms nF to actually increase in ψ. Beyond ψM idea generation ceases up in the
market entirely, so that ideas are only generated inside firms. At this stage, higher
generation costs discourage firm activity, so that nF decreases with ψ. Firms cease
to exist beyond ψF .

4

Extensions and empirical evidence

Our approach has yielded two main results. The first concerns the eﬀect of idea
density on the open exchange of ideas. The second suggests an important symbiotic
relationship between open firms and markets, with firms incubating ideas and markets
both creating their own ideas as well as refining those that could not be elaborated
within firms.
29
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A natural environment to discuss the coincidence of these eﬀects is Silicon Valley,
often taken as evidence that innovation thrives in a free market environment. Hamel
(1999) writes that "in Silicon Valley, ideas, capital, and talent circulate freely, gathering into whatever combinations are most likely to generate innovation ... traditional
companies... spend their energy in resource allocation... the Valley operates through
resource attraction—a system that nurtures innovation. . . . talent is free to go to the
companies oﬀering the most exhilarating work and the greatest potential rewards".
This is broadly consistent with our sketch of ideas as combination of expertise, circulating to seek the right match without using NDA contracts, while firms reward
creative agents and agents with unresolved ideas moving out of firms to start up
ventures.
The intense and open idea exchange in Silicon Valley may seem puzzling, since
California actually has a fairly weak tradition of protecting intellectual property, so
that is not clear how idea generation may be rewarded (see Gilson 1999, Hyde, 1998).
Our model oﬀers a clue, showing that entrepreneurial firm formation and large multiproduct firms are symbiotic. Large firms are a natural source of innovative ideas,
which at times may be realized only if matched with talented market agents. In
turn, a market will attract creative entrepreneurial individuals and support a free
circulation of ideas only for a certain idea density. In our context, a high density of
firms increases idea density in surrounding markets. The open environment in Silicon
Valley may thus thrive thanks to the historical presence of large firms in the area
acting as idea incubators, in addition to the incubating role played by top academic
institutions.
Indeed, there are many large firms in the area, which according to Business Week
accounted for a remarkable 20% of the largest high tech firms in the world in 1997.
Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) provide extensive evidence on the role that
large corporations play in entrepreneurial spawning. Consistent with our mobility
model, they find that more open firms tend to spawn more ventures. Klepper and
Sleeper (2002) provide evidence that established firms play a major role as incubators
for innovative ideas which later are developed in new ventures by departing employees.23 Aoki (2001) and Saxenian (1994) argue that firms with porous boundaries
23

Most R&D is still performed in established firms. The National Science Foundation estimates
private industrial R&D spending at $180 billion in 2003 (latest available data). In comparison,
the National Venture Capital Association reported that year investments in venture capital backed
companies amounting to $18 billion.
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increases the mutual local flow of ideas, while a secretive corporate culture - such
as the hierarchical approach to R&D in Japan and Europe, as well as in some large
US companies, notably the now defunct Digital Equipment Corporation (Saxenian,
1994) - suﬀocates circulation and thus elaboration of internal ideas. These concepts
have led to the diﬀusion of open knowledge strategies (Chesbrough, 2003).
Naturally, many employee-generated ideas are implemented internally. Companies
such as Google or 3M pride themselves of continually generating new ideas in house
(The Economist, 2009; Bartlett and Mohammed, 1995). However, any history of
Silicon Valley comprises a long list of talented people leaving large firms with novel
ideas. In the semiconductor industry each generation of new firms was started by
employees leaving their parent firms, and similar experiences occurred in the laser and
computer storage industry. According to Bhidé (2000), over 70 % of the founders of
firms in the Inc. 500 list of fast growing high tech firms developed ideas encountered
in previous employment.
There is much anecdotal evidence that employees are allowed by employer to
separate, after an idea has failed to be developed internally. Gene Amdahl pleaded
for a long time with his colleagues at IBM, before starting Amdahl Computers. The
empirical literature suggest that lack of local fit is an important determinant of spinoﬀs activity, and that firms often agree to let employees go to try out rejected concepts
in start ups, even when the product may be in their line of business (Klepper and
Sleeper, 2005).
In addition to idea incubation inside firms, our model shows idea generation can
also occur by independent agents, even if exposed to free-riding and idea stealing
incentives. Many entrepreneurs generated their ideas on their own and found appropriate partners to start their firm. Livingston (2007) documents many such examples,
including PayPal and TiVo. Our model predicts that market agents have a comparative advantage in developing valuable ideas requiring modest development budgets,
whereas firms focus on larger scale, complex ideas with substantial ex-ante investment. Interestingly, this result is not a consequence of financial constraints as often
assumed, but of free riding in independent idea exchange, which induces independent
innovators to invest in ideas with inexpensive development costs.
One of the sources for relatively low-cost production of ideas are universities. In
is hardly a coincidence that environments such as Silicon Valley or Boston Route 128
cluster around top research universities. While there is a natural direct eﬀect, these
31
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environments are characterized also by a freer circulation of ideas, which is consistent
with the eﬀect of local idea density in the model.
One limitation of the model is that all employee spin-oﬀs are friendly and occur
only after the internal fit has been fully explored. An earlier version (Hellmann and
Perotti, 2005) considered a model extension where employees with an idea which fit
poorly with the firm’s specialization would leave prior to disclosure, as disclosing the
idea would be a waste of time and eﬀort.24 It is hardly possible to test for unobservable
actions, but there is strong indirect evidence. According to Bhidé (2000), over 70 %
of the founders of firms in the Inc. 500 list of fast growing high tech firms developed
ideas encountered in previous employment.
To oﬀer a fair comparison of firms and markets, we assume that their probability
of meeting a complementor (φ) is the same. In reality, firms do specialize in diﬀerent
types of ideas, seeking employees with complementary skills. Yet firms cannot plan
their composition to favor novel ideas which call for unpredictable combinations of
skills. For ideas that involve incremental innovation, the probability of finding an
fit might be higher internally. However, the opposite may be true for more radical
innovation. Christensen (1997) argues that many successful firms do not adapt well
to radically new ideas and resist their internal development, leading in loss of market
leadership and even exit. Kodak, a firm created and run by chemical engineers, turned
out not to be a natural place to develop digital cameras.
A common perception, shaped by success stories, is that returns are greater for
entrepreneurs than intrapreneurs or employees. The empirical evidence in contrast indicates that the average risk-adjusted return to entrepreneurship is quite low (Hamilton, 2000, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). In our model, entrepreneurs and
intrapreneurs achieve the same utility, but the structure of their payoﬀs is quite distinct. Specifically, intrapreneurs receive a lower compensation in case of success, but
they have more chances of circulating their idea in a protected environment. Entrepreneurs by contrast receive the full value of their ideas, but have to share it with
among founders. The model predicts that if there is a fit within the team, complementors receive as a substantial portion of founder equity, even if they didn’t contribute
the idea. Consistent with this, Marx and Wasserman (2008) find that equal splits
24

Employees may also leave firms without disclosing ideas if these are exceptionally valuable
(Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), if firms do not adjust reward (see Gambardella and Panico,
2006), or if firms are pursuing a strategy of discouraging spin-oﬀs (Hellmann, 2006).
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among founders are common, even if only one of the founders contributed the initial
idea. Evidence on idea stealing is naturally harder to come by. One well-known story
is Steve Job’s taking the idea of a computer mouse during his visit of Xerox Parc.
Our model provides a joint explanation for a variety of diﬀerent types of new
ventures: internal ventures, spin-oﬀs and start-ups. As limitations, the model does
not allow any form of idea stealing within firms, and assume that the reputation
condition holds at all times. In an earlier version (Hellmann Perotti 2005) we showed
how these extreme assumptions could be relaxed. For instance, the firm might be
willing to compensate employees for smaller ideas, but may have an incentive to
renege on highly valuable ideas (as in the classic corporate story at TetraPak).
Our model emphasizes the role of firm boundaries on idea circulation. In a related
vein, Azoulay (2004) finds that pharmaceutical firms, while very active in outsourcing,
maintain strong firm boundaries around knowledge intensive projects. Kremp and
Mairesse (2004) also find a positive relationship between firms’ internal knowledge
management systems and their innovative performance.
Finally, one may ask if venture capital operate in some alternative form. As they
clearly seek to build a reputation for fair dealing among local contacts, in this sense
their behavior may resemble that of firms in our model. However, there are also
fundamental diﬀerences. First, we study ideas at the very initial formation stage,
when the product is not yet defined and there can be no business plan, well before
the issue of financing arises. Even so-called ‘seed stage’ venture capitalists do not
typically get involved at such a stage when neither the product nor the founding team
are in place. Second, the governance of venture capital firms has a looser, networkstyle structure, rather than the hierarchical structure of firms. They also seeks ideas
exclusively outside, in the language of the model acting as late stage complementors.
In any case, as mentioned before, we concur that firms are not the only solution to
control idea stealing. Further exploring alternative governance mechanisms of the
protection of ideas is a promising area of research.

5

Conclusions

Early stage novel ideas may be seen as incomplete concepts needing to be matched
with some complementary expertise for completion, yet facing uncertainty as to what
exactly the required match may be. We analyze the trade-oﬀ between the necessity
33
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to share widely ideas, to identify agents able to elaborate them further, and the risk
of idea stealing associated with sharing nonexcludable information. A free circulation
of ideas in a market setting is eﬃcient for elaboration, but fails to fully reward eﬀort
for invention. We show that individuals may voluntarily join firms with reputational
capital to ensure that their ideas receive feedback without being stolen. Firms create
a legal firm boundary which may contain appropriation of others’ ideas, and manage
a controlled circulation of ideas along with a credible reward system. Yet firms have
limited capacity to elaborate ideas internally, and may therefore allow agents to leave
to try out developing incomplete ideas in new ventures. Our model thus describes
a natural symbiosis between the ability of firms to sustain idea generation and the
comparative advantage of market in elaborating ideas. This approach rationalizes the
process of idea incubation and spawning which seems to describe well the open exchange of ideas across firms and markets typical of successful innovative environments
such as Silicon Valley.
The approach suggests interesting directions for future research. A first issue is to
understand what environments are most conducive to promote both idea generation
and completion, and to explain the movement of ideas by the incentives of inventors
to seek the appropriate environment for completion.
A compelling new research agenda focuses on the generation of ideas in academia
and industry (Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein, 2009). Academic researchers aim
at diﬀusing their ideas, so they rarely capture any value created by their discoveries.
The academic publication system may ensure a basis for public reward, which sustains
the freedom of investigation and idea circulation which researchers value. Our model
suggests that the innovative ideas incubated in academia may have a disproportional
eﬀect in supporting an open exchange environment where ideas circulate easily and
widely. The empirical results in Aghion et al. (2009) support the importance of a
free circulation of ideas, to ensure the maximum degree of elaboration and ultimately
innovation.
Another issue is the self-selection of agents operating in firms and markets. Agents
with a greater predisposition to complement ideas may be better oﬀ outside firms,
where they can expect better rewards. Examples are serial entrepreneurs, venture
capitalists, seasoned angel investors, and professional mentors and consultants able
to help entrepreneurs to turn their ideas into viable businesses (Lee et al., 2000).
Such specialized agents may organize alternative organizational structures, such as
34
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partnership and networks, to obtain greater rewards than firms would grant them.

6
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7
7.1

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1

From a social eﬃcient perspective, it is always preferable that an agent generates
a new idea, rather than be an opportunist. The reason is that it is always more
eﬃcient for an idea-bearer to talk to another idea-bearer, and not an opportunist!
Thus nSO = 0 so that θ = 1.
The subscript t denotes periods. The basic flow equation for idea-bearers is given
by nI,t = φnI,t−1 + nG,t−1 . This says that each period t, there is a fraction φ of ideas
left from the previous period, namely those that didn’t find a match. Moreover, there
are nG,t−1 new ideas. Simple transformations reveal that in steady state we always
nG
1
φ
have nI =
. Using this and nG = 1 − nI we get nSI =
and nSG =
.
φ
1+φ
1+φ
To derive utilities of the social equilibrium, consider any split s of the idea value
z, and suppose naturally that there is no idea stealing. The utility of a idea-bearer
2
is given by UI = φ2 (z + δUG ) + φφ(sz + δUG ) + φφ(sz + δUI ) + φ δUI . A generator
receives UG = −ψ + δUI . We can rewrite these as UI − δUG = φz + φδ(U1 − UG )
and UG − δUG = −ψ + δ(U1 − UG ). We note that these expressions are independent
of s. The split of the idea value does not matter, since all agents generate ideas, so
it doesn’t matter whether they receive their utility from their own or someone else’s
idea. We thus obtain UI − UG = φz + φδ(U1 − UG ) + ψ − δ(U1 − UG ) ⇔ UI − UG =
φz + ψ
δ
ψ
≡ ∆S . Using this in the above utilities we obtain UGS =
∆S −
1 + δφ
1−δ
1−δ
1
ψ
∆S −
. The condition for idea creation to be socially eﬃcient is
and UIS =
1−δ
1−δ
δ
ψ
δφz
∆S −
≥ 0 ⇔ ψ ≤ δ∆S ⇔ ψ ≤
≡ ψS .
given by UG =
1−δ
1−δ
1 − δ + δφ

7.2

Proof of Proposition 2

z
1
Consider the utility of an opportunist. We have UO = θδUO +θφ( +δUO )+θφ( δUO +
2
2
1
z
1
δUI ) which we conveniently rewrite as UO − δUO = θφ + θφ δ(UI − UO ). Next,
2
2
2
z
1
1
consider the utility of an idea-bearer, given by UI = θ[φ( +δUO )+φ( δUO + δUI )]+
2
2
2
z 1
1
2
2
θ[φ (z + δUO ) + 2φφ( + δUO + δUI ) + φ δUI ], which we conveniently rewrite as
2 2
2
z
1
UI − δUO = θφ + θφ δ(UI − UO ) + θφz + θφδ(UI − UO ). Subtracting the two
2
2
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z
1
expressions, we obtain after transformations UI − UO = φ + φ δ(UI − UO ) so that
2
2
d∆
φ
φz
≡ ∆. For future reference, we note that
=
>0
UI − UO =
2 − δ + φδ
dz
2 − δ + φδ
d∆
(2 − δ)z
and
> 0. Using ∆ in the above convenient expressions, we
=
dφ
(2 − δ + φδ)2
θ∆
θ∆
1−δ+θ
and UI = ∆ +
=
∆. The
obtain after transformations UO =
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ
θ∆
+ δ∆ − ψ.
utility of generator is given by UG = −ψ + δUI , so that UG = δ
1−δ
Suppose for a moment that UG ≥ 0, we will return to this below. Equilibrium
requires that UG = UO , or else no agent would be willing to generate ideas. Using the
θ∆
θ∆
ψ
above expressions for UG and UO we obtain δ
+ δ∆ − ψ =
⇔θ=δ− .
1−δ
1−δ
∆
ψ
Note that θ < 1 since 1 > δ > δ − . We can thus rewrite the market utilities as
∆
ψ
ψ
δ∆
∆
UG = UO =
−
and UI =
−
. For future reference, we note that
1−δ 1−δ
1−δ 1−δ
dθ
φ
(2 − δ)z
1
dθ
ψ
ψ
dθ
ψ
=
= − < 0,
=
=
> 0 and
=
2
2
dψ
∆
dz
(∆) 2 − δ + φδ
∆z
dφ
(∆) (2 − δ + φδ)2
ψ(2 − δ)
ψ
≥ 0 ⇔ ψ ≤ δ∆ ≡ ψM . At
> 0. We also note that θ ≥ 0 whenever δ −
2
∆
φz
ψ = ψM we have UO = UG = 0. Thus, for all ψ > ψ M there is no idea generation in
markets, but for ψ < ψ M markets allow for idea generation.
Consider the equilibrium number of types. We denote the fractions of generators,
idea-bearers and opportunists by nG , nI , nO , and note that nG + nI + nO = 1.
nG
. Using
Using the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have nI =
φ
nI
nG + nI + nO = 1 we obtain φnI = 1 − nO − nI . From the definition of θ =
,
nO + nI
1−θ
1−θ
nI which we use to obtain φnI = 1 −
nI − nI ⇔ nI =
we obtain nO =
θ
θ
θ
1−θ
1−θ
θφ
. Thus nO =
nI =
and nG =
. Comparing the competitive
1 + θφ
θ
1 + θφ
1 + θφ
φ
θφ
with the socially optimal equilibrium, we note that nG =
<
= nSG ,
1 + θφ
1+φ
θ
1
θ
nI =
<
= nSI and nO =
> 0 = nSO . The competitive market has
1 + θφ 1 + φ
1 + θφ
too few idea-bearers and too few generators, but too many opportunists.
We now compare the market equilibrium with the socially eﬃcient equilibrium.
φz
φz
We note that ∆ =
<
= ∆S . It immediately follows that
2 − δ + δφ
1 − δ + δφ
ψM = δ∆ < δ∆S = ψS , so that the range where the market equilibrium is feasible is
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smaller than the range of where idea generation is socially eﬃcient. Similarly, we have
ψ
δ
ψ
δ
ψ
δ
UO = UG =
∆−
<
∆S −
= UGS and UI =
∆−
<
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ
ψ
δ
∆S −
= UIS .
1−δ
1−δ
Finally, note that the probability of a generator implementing his own idea if given
2φ
< 1. To see this, note that for each match, the probability of a fit
by
2 − φ(1 + θφ)
is given by θ(φ2 + φφ) + θφ = φ, the probability that the idea-bearer keeps his idea is
1
1 φ(1 + θφ)
2
= ξ, and the probability of losing the idea is
given by θ(φφ + φ ) + θφ =
2
2
2
1
1
φ
given by θφφ +θφ = (θφ+θ). Thus, the probability of a generator implementing
2
2
2
j=∞
X
φ
2φ
2
ξj =
his idea is given by φ + ξφ + ξ φ + ... = φ
=
.
1
−
ξ
2
−
φ(1
+
θφ)
j=0

7.3

Proof of Corollary to Proposition 2

δ∆
−
1−δ
ψ
dUO
1
dUO
δ
φ
dUO
. We have
= −
< 0,
=
> 0, and
=
1−δ
dψ
1−δ
dz
1 − δ 2 − δ + φδ
dφ
z(2 − δ)
δ
> 0. Since UO = UG we have the same results for UG . For
1 − δ (2 − δ + φδ)2
dUI
dUO
dUI
dUO
d∆
=
< 0,
=
+
> 0 and
UI we use UI = ∆ + UO so that
dψ
dψ
dz
dz
dz
dUI
dUO d∆
=
+
> 0.
dφ
dφ
dφ
ψ
dnI
dnI dθ
1
θ
For part (iii), consider nI =
, so that
=
=
> 0,
2
1 + θφ
dz
dθ dz
(1 + θφ) ∆z
dnI dθ
1
1
dnI dθ
dnI
1
dnI
dnI
ψ(2 − δ)
−
=
=−
=
+
=
<
0,
dψ
dθ dψ
∆ (1 + θφ)2
dφ
dθ dφ
dφ
(1 + θφ)2 φ2 z
θ2
1
ψ2−δ
ψ
2
=
[
decreasing in ψ, implying
2 − θ ]. Note that θ = δ −
2
2
(1 + θφ)
(1 + θφ) z φ
∆
ψ2−δ
ψ2−δ
2
φ
that
− θ2 = 0,
2 − θ is increasing in ψ. We define ψ implicitly from
z φ
z φ2
dnI
dnI
and claim that
< 0 for ψ < ψ φ and
< 0 for ψ ∈ (ψφ , ψM ). To see this, note
dφ
dφ
ψ2−δ
dnI
2
2
that for ψ → 0 we have [
< 0. Moreover, for
2 − θ ] → −δ < 0 so that
z φ
dφ
ψ2−δ
ψM 2 − δ
dnI
2
> 0.
−
θ
]
→
> 0 so that
ψ → ψM we have θ → 0 so that [
2
2
z φ
z φ
dφ
Intuitively, there are two eﬀects are work. A higher chance of meeting a complementor
We will prove the four parts out of sequence. For part (iv), consider UO =
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increases the generation of new ideas, which increases nI . However, a higher chance
also means that ideas clear the market faster, so that there are fewer idea-bearers in
steady state.
dnI
dnG
dnI dθ
dnG
=φ
< 0,
=φ
> 0 and
For part (i) we use nG = φnI . We have
dψ
dψ
dz
dθ dz
dnG
dnI
1
φ
ψ2−δ
θ
ψ2−δ
2
=φ
+ nI =
=
+ θ] > 0
[
[
2 −θ ]+
2
2
dφ
dφ
(1 + θφ) z φ
1 + θφ (1 + θφ) z φ
dnG
dnI
dnO
For part (ii) we can use nO = 1 − nG − nI , so that
=−
−
> 0,
dψ
dψ
dψ
dnG
dnI
dnO
dnG
dnI
1
ψ2−δ
dnO
= −
−
< 0 and
= −
−
= −
+ θ] −
[
2
dz
dz
dz
dφ
dφ
dφ
(1 + θφ) z φ
1
ψ2−δ
1
ψ2−δ
1
2
[
[
(1 + ) + θθ] < 0.
2 −θ ] = −
2
2
(1 + θφ) z φ
(1 + θφ) z φ
φ

7.4

Proof of Proposition 3

Each time two partners meet they each incur a transactions cost c to draft and sign
their NDAs. We now consider the ensuing equilibrium behavior. We focus on the
case of small transaction costs, so that all our proofs are evaluated in a neighborhood
of c = 0.
We first examine the bargaining game in case of a match. We assume that bargaining outcomes are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. Even in the
signee cannot steal the idea, he still has some bargaining power, due to the fact
that the issuer would still have to find another partner, which takes time. If two
partners find a fit for both of their ideas, we are back to a symmetric bargaining
game. In this case the two NDAs cancel out each other, and the bargaining outcome is an equal split. Consider now the case where only one idea fits, and let s
be the share of profits for the idea-bearer (i.e., the NDA issuer). Suppose for a
moment that the NDA signee is an idea-bearer himself, but that there was no fit
for his idea. If the two agent cooperate, then the NDA issuer gets sz + δU0N and
the signee gets sz + δUIN . In case of disagreement, the issuer retains δUIN and the
signee also obtains δUIN . The Nash bargaining solution gives the NDA issuer a utility
1
1
1
1 δ∆N
sz + δU0N = [z + δ(UON + UIN ) + δUIN − δUIN ] = z + δ(UON + UIN ) ⇔ s = +
2
2
2
2
2z
where ∆N = UIN − UON . If instead the signee is an opportunist, it is easy to see that
1
the Nash bargaining solution yields sz + δU0N = [z + δ(UON + UON ) + δUIN − δUON ]
2
1 δ∆N
, which is identical to the previous case.
⇔s= +
2
2z
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We now derive the equilibrium utilities. We need to distinguish two cases, one
where opportunists exist, and one where there are no more opportunists. Consider
first the case where there are no opportunists. Below we derive the condition for
when this applies. Without opportunists, the utility of idea-bearer is given by UIN =
2
φ2 (z+δUGN )+φφ(sz+δUGN )+φφ(sz+δUIN )+φ δUIN −c. Using the above expression for
s, this can be rewritten as UIN −δUGN = φz+φδ(UIN −UGN )−c. The utility of a generator
is given by UGN = −ψ+δUIN or UGN −δUGN = −ψ+δ(UIN −UGN ). Subtracting the second
φz + ψ − c
from the first, we obtain after simple transformations UIN − UGN =
=
1 + φδ
δ
ψ
∆Sc −
and UIN =
∆Sc . Using this in the above utilities we obtain UGN =
1−δ
1−δ
1
ψ
∆Sc −
. This shows that without opportunists, the equilibrium is always
1−δ
1−δ
eﬃcient, except for transactions costs.
Now suppose that there are some opportunists in equilibrium. Their utility is given
by UON = θδUON +θφ(sz+δUON )+θφ(δUON )−c which we rewrite as UON −δUON = θφsz−c.
1
θφ N
1
θφ
Using sz = z − δ(UIN − UON ) this yields UON − δUON =
z−
δ∆ − c. The
2
2
2
2
utility of an idea-bearer is given by UIN = θ[φ(sz + δUON ) + φδUIN ] + θ[φ2 (z + δUON ) +
2
φφ(sz +δUON )+φφ(sz +δUIN )+φ δUIN ]−c. After standard transformations we obtain
1
1
UIN − δUON = θφz + θφ z + θφ δ∆N + φδ∆N − c. Combing these two equations we
2
2
φz
. The utility of a generator is given by UGN = −ψ + δUIN .
obtain ∆N =
2 − 2δ + δφ
To find the equilibrium fraction θN we use again UON = UGN and obtain after simple
2 c − ψ + δ∆N
δ
ψ−c
transformations θN =
=
. From this we obtain
−
N
φ z − δ∆
1−δ
(1 − δ)∆N
δ∆N
∆N
ψ
ψ
UON = UGN =
−
and UIN =
−
. This equilibrium
(1 − δ)
(1 − δ)
(1 − δ)
(1 − δ)
1
δ∆N
is feasible for UGN ≥ 0 ⇔ ψ ≤ δ∆N = ψN . Note also that s =
+
=
2
2z
δ
φz
1 − δ + δφ
1
+
=
< 1.
2 2z 2 − 2δ + δφ 2 − 2δ + δφ
We are now in a position to examine when opportunists actually exist in equilibrium. The condition is simply given by θN ≤ 1 ⇔ ψ ≥ c + (2δ − 1)∆N = ψO . I n
1
c
case that δ < (1 + ∆N ), it is convenient to write ψO = 0. We note that at ψ = ψO
2
we have θN = 1 so that UO = UG . However, for any lower values of ψ, an agent is
better oﬀ generating an idea, rather than staying as an opportunist in the market.
We conclude that for ψ < ψ O the equilibrium has no opportunists, and for ψ > ψ 0
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the equilibrium always entails some positive fraction of opportunists. Note also that
the overall feasible range of the NDA equilibrium is determined by the condition
ψ ≤ δ∆N ≡ ψN . This completes the proof of parts (i) to (iii).
φz
φz
For part (iv), we note that ψN < ψS from ∆N =
<
= ∆S .
2 − 2δ + δφ 1 − δ + δφ
φz
φz
Also, ψN > ψM from ∆N =
>
= ∆. Moreover, we now show
2 − 2δ + δφ
2 − δ + δφ
δ
ψ−c
ψ
that θM < θN . To see this, use δ − <
−
. We evaluate this again at
∆ 1 − δ (1 − δ)∆N
φz
c = 0 and obtain after several transformations the condition ψ < δ
= ψS ,
1 − δ + φδ
which is merely the condition for ψ to be in the socially eﬃcient range. Using now
θ
1−θ
θφ
from Proposition 2 the expressions nI =
, nO =
and nG =
,
1 + θφ
1 + θφ
1 + θφ
we note that nI and nG are increasing and nO decreasing in θ. Using θM < θN <
S
M
N
S
1 = θS we immediately obtain the inequalities nG < nN
G < nG , nI < nI < nI and
N
S
N
S
nM
O > nO > nO = 0. Finally, we note that the inequalities UG < UG < UG and
UI < UIN < UIS immediately follow from ∆ < ∆N < ∆S .

7.5

Proof of Proposition 4

We first show how the agent’s payoﬀ depends on NDAs and disclosure. In the following three tables, the first row shows A’s and the second row B’s utility. The first
table show the payoﬀs when both parties sign a mutual NDA. For simplicity we omit
the superscripts throughout the proof.

With NDA

B is I

A is I

δUO + φz + φδ∆ − c
δUO + φz + φδ∆ − c

A is O

φz φ
+ δ∆ − c
δUO +
2
2
φ
φz
δUO +
+ (1 − )δ∆ − c
2
2

B is O
φz
φ
+ (1 − )δ∆ − c,
δUO +
2
2
φz φ
δUO +
− δ∆ − c
2
2
δUO − c
δUO − c

To explain the payoﬀs in the case where A = I and B = I, note that UI =
z δ
2
φ2 (z + δUO ) + 2φφ( + (UI + UO )) + φ δUI −c = δUO + φz + φδ∆ − c. To explain
2 2
the payoﬀs in the case where A = I and B = O, note that A’s utility is given by
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1
1
δ
UIA = φ(sz + δUO ) + φδUI − c. Using sz = z + ∆ we obtain UIA = δUO + φ z +
2
2
2
φ
φz
δ
φ ∆ + φδ∆ −c = δUO + + (1 − )δ∆ − c. At the same time, B’s utility is given by
2
2
2
z δ∆
φz φ
UIB = φ(sz+δUO )+φδUO −c. Using sz = −
we obtain UIB = δUO + − δ∆−c.
2 2
2 2
The second table shows the payoﬀs when there is no NDA and idea-bearers disclose
their idea.

No NDA, with disclosure

B is I

A is I

δUO + φz + φδ∆
δUO + φz + φδ∆

A is O

z
δ
δUO + φ + φ ∆
2
2
z
δ
δUO + φ + φ ∆
2
2

B is O
z
δ
δUO + φ + φ ∆
2
2
z
δ
δUO + φ + φ ∆
2
2
δUO
δUO

To explain the payoﬀs in the case where A = I and B = I, note that UI =
z 1
1
2
φ2 (z + δUO ) + 2φφ( + δUO + δUI ) + φ δUI = δUO + φz + φδ∆. In the case where
2 2
2
z
1
1
z
1
A
A = I and B = O, note that UI = φ( +δUO )+φ( δUO + δUI ) = δUO +φ +φ δ∆.
2
2
2
2
2
In that case we also have UIB = UIA . This is because without NDAs the two partners
have the same bargaining power, irrespective of who generated the idea.
The third table shows the payoﬀs when there is no NDA in place and idea-bearers
do not disclose their ideas.
No NDA, no disclosure B is I B is O
δUO
δUI
A is I
δUI
δUI
δUO
δUI
A is O
δUO
δUO
Comparing Table 1 with Table 2, and using standard transformations, we identify
the net benefit of using a mutual NDA, when the default assumption is that ideabearers disclose even without an NDA.
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Benefit of NDAs, with disclosure

B is I

A is I

−c
−c

B is O
δ
∆−c
2
δ
− ∆−c
2

δ
− ∆−c
−c
2
A is O
δ
−c
∆−c
2
We note that not signing is a dominant strategy for O-types. Thus, only I-types
would consider issuing or signing NDAs. Once it is understood that O-types do not
sign, not signing also becomes the optimal strategy for I-types. It follows that NDAs
are never signed.
Comparing Table 1 with Table 3 and using standard transformations, we identify
the net benefit of using a mutual NDA, when the default assumption is that ideabearers would not disclose an idea without an NDA.

Benefit of NDAs, no disclosure

B is I

A is I

φ(z − δ∆) − c
φ(z − δ∆) − c

A is O

φ
(z − δ∆) − c
2
φ
(z − δ∆) − c
2

B is O
φ
(z − δ∆) − c
2
φ
(z − δ∆) − c
2
−c
−c

φ
We note that for small c (indeed, for any c < (z − δ∆)), signing an NDA is a
2
dominant strategy.
We are now in a position to examine the disclosure decisions. Consider a candidate
equilibrium without NDAs. In the main text we have already seen that, using the
intuitive criterion, the refusal to sign an NDA does not help to eliminate any types,
so that there is no updating of beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path. Still, we have to
verify that agents want to disclose their idea. Consider the deviation of agent A not
to disclose. We will show that this deviation is not beneficial to A. The deviation
not to disclose is unilateral, so we have to calculate payoﬀ for the case where B
discloses but A doesn’t. Whether A’s idea fits or not will never be discovered. If
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B is O, there is nothing to disclose, so A gets δUI and B gets δUO . If B is I and
there is no fit, then A gets δUI and B gets δUO . Finally, if B is I and there is a
fit, we consider the following bargaining game. No cooperation gives each agent an
outside option of utility δUI . The joint value of cooperation is z + δUI + δUO . Thus,
z
1
A’s utility is given by [z + δUI + δUO + δUI − δUO ] = + δUI and B’s utility is
2
2
z
+ δUO . Combining all of these results, the expected utility to A of not disclosing
2
z
z
is given by UAnodis = θφ( + δUI ) + θφδUI + θδUI = δUI + θφ . We compare this
2
2
against the equilibrium path payoﬀ of disclosing the idea. From Proposition 2, we
z
1
use UIdis = δUO + θφ + θφ δ∆ + θφz + θφδ∆. Using standard transformations
2
2
z
1
we obtain UIdis − UAnodis = φ( − δ∆) − θφ δ∆. Further transformations show that
2
2
UIdis > UAnodis ⇔ 2 > δ(2−φθ), which is always true. Thus the deviation to unilaterally
not disclose is never optimal.
In fact, we can show an even stronger result, namely that an agent cannot commit
not to disclose even if he expects the other agent to be an opportunists. To show
this, we redo the above calculations for θ = 0, i.e., we consider the case where A
believes that B is an O type for sure. A’s payoﬀ from disclosing his idea to a known
z
1
opportunist is UA = δUO + φ + φ δ∆ while the payoﬀ to refusing to disclose idea
2
2
z
1
is δUI . Thus A cannot commit not to disclose whenever δUI < δUO + φ + φ δ∆,
2
2
which yields after transformations 2 > 2δ, which is always true. This last insight will
be useful to understand why it is never optimal for an agent to induce the other sign
an NDA by making a payment, which we examine next.
Consider the possibility of paying for an NDA. Again we start with an equilibrium
where there are no NDAs. We now consider a one-period deviation where A makes a
oﬀer to B of a payment τ in exchange for signing an NDA. By the intuitive criterion,
only I-type would make such an oﬀer, i.e., B immediately infers that A is an I type.
The questions are what the optimal level of τ is, and what B’s response would be.
Note that as this is a unilateral deviation, only one NDA is oﬀered. For simplicity,
we assume that the transaction costs are again given by c.
We have already seen that A can never commit not to disclose, irrespective of
whether B signs the NDA or not. The question is under what circumstances B
would thus sign the NDA. Consider the bargaining outcome after the NDA is signed.
If B is O, he cannot steal the idea. The joint value from cooperation is z +δUO +δUO ,
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while noncooperation gives δUI and δUO .From the Nash bargaining solution, A and
z + δ∆
z − δ∆
B respectively obtain δUO +
and δUO +
. Thus, if the NDA is signed
2
2
z + δ∆
z − δ∆
and UB = −c+τ +δUO +φ
.
and B is O we have UA = −c−τ +δUO +φ
2
2
z
If the NDA is not signed, then B (as an O type) obtains δUO + φ + φδ∆ as usual.
2
φ
B therefore signs the NDA if τ ≥ c + (1 − )δ∆. A’s net benefit of oﬀering the NDA
2
z + δ∆
z
φ
is −c − τ + δUO + φ
− (δUO + φ − φδ∆) = −c − τ + (1 − )δ∆. Whenever A
2
2
2
φ
oﬀers the cheapest τ so that B = O is just willing to sign, namely τ = c + (1 − )δ∆,
2
his net gain is −2c, i.e., A looses exactly the total transaction costs.
If instead B is I, there is no risk of stealing anyway. When both ideas fit, the usual
bargaining gives each z + δUO . If only one idea fits, the joint value is z + δUO + δUI .
Notice the outside values δUI are the same for both agents, thus the Nash bargaining
z + δ∆
solution gives δUO +
to both. Finally, if neither idea fits, each agent gets his
2
outside option. Thus, if the NDA is signed and B is I we have after transformations
UA = −c − τ + δUO + φz + φδ∆ and UB = −c + τ + δUO + φz + φδ∆. If the NDA
is not signed, then B (as an I type) obtains −c + τ + δUO + φz + φδ∆ as usual. B
therefore signs the NDA if τ ≥ c. The net benefit for A of oﬀering the NDA is −c − τ .
Whenever A oﬀers the cheapest τ so that B = I is just willing to sign, namely τ = c,
his net gain is again −2c, i.e., A again looses the total transaction costs.
In summary, we see that A can use the payment τ to separate out types, i.e., by
φ
oﬀering any payment τ ∈ [c, c + (1 − )δ∆), only the I and not the O type would
2
accept the oﬀer. However, since the NDA does not increase the joint value, doing so
is never profitable for A. Hence the deviation to oﬀer a payment for an NDA is never
beneficial, and the equilibrium without NDAs remains stable.

7.6

Proof of Proposition 5

We now consider a candidate equilibrium with NDAs, and show when non-disclosure
after a refusal to sign an NDA is optimal. For this we look at a possible deviation
from the expected behavior, where after a refusal to sign an NDA, one agent, call him
B, deviates by still disclosing his idea. This is a unilateral deviation, so that the other
agent, call him A, behaves as expected, refusing to disclose his idea. Whether A’s
idea fits is thus never discovered. For B, disclosure is obviously only relevant when B
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is an I-type. Suppose first that A = I, then either B’s idea doesn’t fit, so that B gets
δUI and A gets δUI ; or B’s idea fits. In case of non-cooperation, B’s outside option is
δUI and A’s outside option is δUI . The joint value under cooperation is z +δUO +δUI .
1
z δ
Using Nash bargaining, B gets [z+δUO +δUI +δUI −δUI ] = + (UI +UO ). We note
2
2 2
that B extracts exactly the same amount as if he had an NDA. This is because if A
has an idea, then A has no way of stealing the idea. Suppose next that A = O. Either
δ
B’s idea doesn’t fit, so that because of stealing, B and A both get (UI +UO ). Or B’s
2
δ
idea fits. In case of non-cooperation, the symmetric outside option is (UI + UO ),
2
and the joint value from cooperation is z + δUO + δUO . Using Nash bargaining, A
1
δ
δ
z
and B both get [z + δUO + δUO + (UI + UO ) − (UI + UO )] = + δUO , which is
2
2
2
2
the standard equal split. Overall, B’s expected utility in the proposed deviation is
δ
z
z
δ
U dev = θφ[ + (UI + UO )] + θφδUI + θφ[ + δUO ] + θφ (UI + UO ). We compare
2 2
2
2
this payoﬀ against the expected behavior of non-disclosure, which gives B a utility of
δUI . The equilibrium condition is thus U dev − δUI < 0. After transformations, this
z
δ∆
simplifies to U dev − δUI = φ − (φ + θ)
< 0. The first term measures the net
2
2
benefit of an earlier idea resolution, the second term measures the loss of bargaining
power to the idea-bearer.
Consider first an equilibrium with ψ < ψ O , so that there are no opportunists. We
2(1 − δ)z
have θ = 1, so that U dev − δUI = φ
> 0. This implies that the condition
2 − 2δ + δφ
for the NDA equilibrium to exist is never satisfied. The intuition is simply that an
NDA does not change the bargaining game if the partner is also an idea-bearer. Thus,
if there are no opportunists, there is never a reason to sign an NDA, because the NDA
isn’t necessary to protect ideas.
Consider next the case where ψ > ψ O , so that there are some opportunists. We can
2
rewrite the condition U dev −δUI = φz−(φ+θ)δ∆ < 0 as θ < 3− . This shows that the
δ
fraction of opportunists has to be suﬃciently high for non-disclosure to be credible.
(ψ − c)
δ
−
we can
Using the equilibrium value of the NDA equilibrium θN =
1 − δ (1 − δ)∆N
2 − 5δ + 4δ 2 N b
rewrite the condition U dev < δUI ⇔ ψ > c +
∆ = ψ. It is easy to verify
δ
b > ψ O . Moreover, we examine under what circumstances we have ψ
b < ψ N . We
that ψ
2
b at c = 0 and obtain ψ
b < ψ N ⇔ 2 − 5δ + 4δ ∆N < δ∆N ⇔ 2−5δ+3δ 2 < 0.
evaluate ψ
δ
2
2
The quadratic equation 3δ − 5δ + 2 = 0 has two roots, at δ = and at δ = 1. It
3
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2
b < ψ N and for δ < 2 we
follows that for δ ∈ ( , 1) we have 2 − 5δ + 3δ 2 < 0 ⇔ ψ
3
3
b > ψ N . It follows that the NDA equilibrium exists for
have 2 − 5δ + 3δ 2 > 0 ⇔ ψ
2
b < ψ < ψN .
< δ < 1 and ψ
3
Finally, note also that the possibility of oﬀering a payment in exchange of an
NDAs has no eﬀect on an NDA equilibrium. In such an equilibrium the two parties
would just swap the payment τ . Moreover, oﬀ the equilibrium path when one party
refuses the NDA there are no payments, so the analysis is the same as before.

7.7

Proof of Proposition 6

We first derive an expression for the utility of a typical employee. This is derived from
an iterative set of equations. UE denotes the utility of a newly starting employee, or
equivalently, of an employee without ideas. UE,j is the utility of an employee that is
about to talk to the j th internal match. We have UE = −ψ + δUE,1 , UE,j = φ(bz +
δUE ) + φδUE,j+1 , for any j = 1, ..., F and UE,F +1 = UI , which is the utility of leaving
the firm. Using the above equations we obtain after transformations UE − δUE =
2
F −1
F
e = Pj=F −1 φj δ j+1
−ψ+φbz[δ+φδ 2 +φ δ 3 +...+φ δ F ]+φ δ F +1 (UI −UE ). We define φ
j=0
e + φF δ F +1 (UI − UE ). In a market equilibrium we must
so that UE − δUE = −ψ + φφbz
φz
have UE = UO , so that UI − UO =
= ∆ as before. It follows that
2 − δ + δφ
e + φF δ F +1 ∆
−ψ + φφbz
θ∆
. The firm sets bz so that UE = UO =
. Thus the
UE =
1−δ
1−δ
F
ψ + θ∆ − φ δ F +1 ∆
∗
optimal compensation satisfies b =
. This shows the first part
e
φφz
(ii).
For part (iii) we need to verify that this optimal compensation ensures that employees want to disclose their ideas to the firm, rather than leaving the firm without
disclosing their idea. In fact, we will demonstrate a slightly stronger property of the
optimal compensation, namely that the optimal b is such that the employee never has
an incentive to leave the firm, up until he has talked to all available internal matches.
Consider the utility of an employee that is meeting with his last internal match, i.e.,
j = F . He either finds an internal match this time to get the bonus bz, or he will
leave the firm. Formally, we have UE,F = φ(bF z + δUE ) + φδUI = δUE + φbz + φδ∆.
We compare this with the utility of taking the idea outside the firm, in which
case the employee becomes an idea-bearer in the market and gets (from Proposi52
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θ
θ
tion 2) UI = δUO + (θ + )φz + (θ + )φδ∆. The employee prefers to stay in2
2
side the firm for one more round whenever UE,F ≥ UI . We define bb as the bonus
that ensures that the employee is just indiﬀerent between staying and leaving, i.e.,
θ
θ
φz
UE,F (bb) = UI ⇔ φbbz + φδ∆ = (θ + )φz + (θ + )φδ∆. Using ∆ =
2
2
2 − δ + δφ
1
+
θ
−
δ
+
δφ
we obtain after transformations bb =
. As a next step, we show that
2 − δ + δφ
if the firm uses bb, the employee is not only indiﬀerent at the time of the last internal match, but in fact he is indiﬀerent at any time that he is circulating an idea
inside the firm. To see this, consider the penultimate match, i.e., j = F − 1.
We have UE,F −1 = φ(bbz + δUE ) + φδUE,F = δUO + φbbz + φδ∆. But this means
that UE,F −1 (bb) = UE,F (bb). Using an iterative logic, we find that UE,,j (bb) = UI for
j = 1, ..., F . This shows that for any b ≥ bb the employee is willing to disclose his idea
to the firm, and stay inside the firm as long as there are internal matches.
The question remains what the relationship is between bb and the optimal b∗ derived
above. Consider first an equilibrium where ideas are generated in the market, i.e.,
ψ < ψ M . In this case we know from Proposition 2 that UG = −ψ +δUI and UG = UO .
The iterative equations above already established that UE = −ψ + δUE,1 , and we
just saw that UE,,j (bb) = UI so that for j = 1 we have UE (bb) = −ψ + δUI . At
the time of hiring, the firm has to match the employees’ outside option, so that
UE = UO = UG = −ψ+δUI . It follows that b∗ = bb, i.e., that the optimal compensation
is such that the employee is just indiﬀerent between leaving and staying. This proves
the first bullet point under part (iii). For the second bullet point of part (iii), we
consider the case where ψ > ψ M . In this case there is no idea generation in the
market, implying UG < UO (where UO is driven oﬀ the benefits of listening to ideas
that were generated by employees who subsequently left the firm). If the firm were to
set a bonus bb, it would still be true that UE,j (bb) = UI for j = 1, ..., F . The problem,
however, would be that employees now have insuﬃcient incentives to generate ideas,
since UE = −ψ + δUE,1 = −ψ + δUI = UG < UE . The firm therefore sets b∗ > bb,
F
ψ + θ∆ − φ δ F +1 ∆
∗
∗
where b still given by b =
. Since b∗ is strictly larger than bb, we
e
φφz
have UE,,j (b∗ ) > UE,,j (bb) = UI for j = 1, ..., F . This completes the proof of part (iii).
Note also that the firm wanted to take a stake in the employee’s spin-oﬀ. This
corresponds to reducing ∆ by some given amount. If the firm were to do this, then
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this would reduce the employee’s ex-ante utility, and the firm would therefore require
an equivalent raise in b∗ . W.l.o.g. we therefore assume that the firm lets the employee
go without taking a stake in spin-oﬀ. This explains part (i).
For part (iv), finally, consider now the total revenues that a firm makes on a new
employee. The firm’s utility from an employee has a similar recursive structure than
before. We have UF = δUF,1 , UF,j = φ(bz + δUF ) + φδUF,j+1 for any j = 1, ..., F and
2
F −1
UF,F +1 = 0. Similar to before we obtain UF −δUF = φbz[δ+φδ 2 +φ δ 3 +...+φ δ F ]+
e
φφbz
F
. We then rewrite this as UF = UF + UE − UE =
φ δF +1 (UF − UF ) so that UF =
1−δ
F F +1
e + φF δ F +1 ∆
e − ψ + φφbz
e
∆
φφbz
e − UO where U
e = φφz − ψ + φ δ
=U
. The j th
1−δ
1−δ
e − (E + 1)UO ≥ Kj where Kj
entrant’s condition is given by EUF − Kj ≥ UO ⇔ E U
are fixed entry costs. Given a distribution Ω(Kj ), the number of firms is given by
e − (E + 1)UO ). This completes the proof of part (iv).
nF = Ω(E U
To determine the fractions of employees generating and circulating ideas as follows,
let fE,j be the fraction of employees that are at the j th stage of circulating an idea.
We have fE,1 = fG and fE,j+1 = φfE,j for all j = 1, ..., F . The total number of
Pj=F
Pj=F
j−1
b where we
= fG φ
idea-bearers inside the firm is fI =
j=1 fE,j =
j=1 fG φ
b = Pj=F φj−1 . Using fG + fI = 1 we immediately obtain fG = 1
define φ
and
j=1
b
1+φ
b
φ
fI =
. This completes the proof of part (v).
b
1+φ
To determine the upper bound of ψ above which firms are not feasible, we consider
e + φF δ F +1 ∆ − ψ
φ
φz
e −UO ) = E(
−
the condition Π ≥ Kmin +UO . We have Π = EUF = E(U
1−δ
UO ). Suppose for now that ψF > ψM , then the first entrant faces a complete absence of ideas, so that UO = 0. Thus the first entrants entry condition simplifies
e + φF δ F +1 ∆ − ψ
φφz
e + φF δ F +1 ∆ − (1 − δ))Kmin = ψF .
≥ Kmin ⇔ ψ ≤ φφz
to E
1−δ
E
(1
−
δ))K
F
min
e + φ δ F +1 ∆ −
> δ∆ ⇔ Kmin <
The condition ψF > ψM requires φφz
E
E
e + φF δ F +1 ∆ − δ∆] ≡ K
e
e
[
[
[φφz
min . Note that Kmin > 0 since φφz > δ∆ ⇔ φ >
1−δ
P
δ
1 − δ + φδ Pj=F j−1 j
δ
j−1 j
] ⇔ δ + j=F
⇔δ
+ j=2 φ δ > 0.
δ >
j=2 φ
2 − δ + φδ
2 − δ + φδ
2 − δ + φδ
Consider now the relationship between E and F . Define F = E + R where E is
fixed number of employment slots and R is number of ‘relevant’ replacements. Not all
replacement are relevant to an idea-bearer who we call A. In particular, if employee B
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is replaced by B 0 before A managed to talk to B, the replacement is irrelevant for A.
We therefore define relevant replacements as those that occur after the idea-bearer
talked to the particular employee. To calculate the steady-state expected number
of replacements, consider the following. An idea-bearing employee first talks to E
employees. As noted above, some of them like B 0 may have joined the firm only
recently, this does not matter here. After talking to the first E employees, the only
employees left to talk to must be replacements. Naturally we also need to take into
account that there may be replacements of replacement. Consider thus the expected
number of replacements that would be in the firm after A talked to N employees,
where N can take any value for now. To calculate the number of replacements
R(N), we note that the employee that A talked to one period ago will have left with
F
probability χ1 = φ . The employee A talked to two periods ago will have left with
F
F
F
probability χ2 = φ +(1−φ )φ . More generally, the employee A talked to n periods
F
F
F
F
F
ago will have left with probability χn = φ + (1 − φ )φ + +(1 − φ )2 φ .... + (1 −
F
F
F Pj=n
F n−1
φ )n−1 φ = φ
. After N periods, the expected number of employees
j=1 (1−φ )
P
χn . Using the definition of χn this
that will have left is therefore R(N, F, φ) = n=N
Pj=N −1 n=1
F
F
can also be rewritten as R(N, F, φ) = j=0 (N −j)(1−φ )j φ . This expression can
be evaluate for any N. Of particular interest is the case where N = F . With a slight
P
F j F
abuse of notation we write R(N = F, F, φ) = R(F, φ) = j=F
j=0 (F − j)(1 − φ ) φ .
At N = F , A will have talked to all employees plus all relevant replacements. At
that point A will have talked to everyone. If there still is not internal fit, it is time
to leave the firm.
From a mathematical perspective, F is found by a fixed point argument. On the
one hand, it must be that F = E + R. On the other hand, the number of replacement
must satisfy R = R(F, φ). The number of replacements is thus given by the implicit
equation F = E + R(F, φ), which does not have an explicit solution. However, we
can determine some properties. Using the standard stability requirement of the fixed
dR
< 1. Totally diﬀerentiating the fixed point equation we obtain
point implies 0 <
dF
dR
dR
dF
1
dF = dE +
dF +
dφ. We immediately obtain
=
> 0. We
dF
dφ
dE
1 − (dR/dF )
(dR/dφ)
dF
dR
dF
=
. Thus sign( ) = sign( ). We note that
also note that
dφ
1 − (dR/dF )
dφ
dφ
F
dR dφ
dR
F −1 dR
F −1 Pj=F
F j
F j−1 F
= F
= −F φ
= −F φ
φ ]
j=0 (F − j)[(1 − φ ) − j(1 − φ )
F
dφ
dφ dφ
dφ
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F −1 Pj=F
F j−1
F
= −F φ
[1−(j+1)φ ]. The terms in the square brackets are
j=0 (F −j)(1−φ )
positive. To formally ensure that a suﬃcient (but by now means necessary) condition
dF
dR
F
is that (F + 1)φ < 1. If this condition is satisfied, we have sign( ) = sign( ) <
dφ
dφ
0.

7.8

Proof of Proposition 7

To show that the firm always preserves it reputation, we need to ensure that it never
has an incentive to deviate. We therefore only need to consider the payoﬀ from the
largest possible deviation. The most profitable deviation for the firm would be to
refuse paying out bonuses. Moreover, the largest possible gain would occur of all
employees had implemented an idea at the same time. In that case, the firm could
make a one-time profit of Ebz. After that, the firm owner would lose her reputation.
In our local reputation model, we assume that the firm owner can slip back into the
pool of agents, possible under a disguised identity. In this case, her continuation
payoﬀ after a deviation is UO . Thus, the reputation condition is given by
Ebz + δUO < δEUF ⇔ Ebz < δ(EUF − UO )
φz
φz
=
< ∞ and limθM =
δ→1
δ→1
δ→1
2 − δ + φδ
1+φ
F
ψ + θ∆ − φ ∆
ψ
< ∞. Moreover, we have EUF −UO =
1− < ∞, so that limEbz =
b
δ→1
∆
φφ
e + φF δ F +1 ∆) − (E + 1)δ∆ + ψ
E(φ
φz
e − (E + 1)UO =
EU
, so that lim(EUF − UO ) =
δ→1
1−δ
F F +1
e
E(φφz + φ δ
∆) − (E + 1)δ∆ + ψ
lim
= ∞. The benefits of stealing all employee
δ→1
1−δ
bonuses is finite for all δ, but the benefit of keeping a reputation is unbounded for
δ → 1. It follows that for δ suﬃciently close to 1, the reputation condition is always
satisfied.
e = φ
b < ∞, lim∆ =
We note that limφ

7.9

Proof of Proposition 8

As a preliminary step, we show how the equilibrium fractions nI and nO depend on
the density of firms nF . Given the finite size of firms, every period, there are some
b
φ
F
F
.
employees leaving with ideas, which we denote by nL = nE φ fI = nF Eφ
b
1+φ
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Idea-bearer in the market are either newly departed employees, or else preexisting
idea-bearers that either stole an idea, or generated it as an employee and circulate
nL
⇔ nI =
it already in the market. Formally, nI,t = nL,t−1 + φnI,t−1 ⇔ nI =
φ
F
F
b
b
φ
φ
φ
φ
. Using nF + nE + nI + nO = 1 we get nO = 1 − nF (E + 1 + E
).
nF E
b
b
φ 1+φ
φ 1+φ
F
b
nI
φ
EnF
φ
Using θ =
.
we get θ =
b
nI + nO
1 − (E + 1)nF φ 1 + φ
We now derive the M curve, which shows how the market utility varies with
∆
, where θ is
the density of firms. The market utility is given by UO = θ
1−δ
now given by the above expression. The M equation is thus defined by UO =
F
F
b
b
EnF
E
φ
φ
∆
∆
φ
∂UO
φ
=
> 0.
. Clearly,
b
b
1 − (E + 1)nF φ 1 + φ 1 − δ
∂nF
φ 1 + φ 1 − δ (1 − (E + 1)nF )2
F
b
φ
∂UO
φ
1
EnF
φ
For the comparative statics we have
=
>
b 1 − δ 2 − δ + φδ
∂z
1 − (E + 1)nF φ 1 + φ
∂UO
= 0. The comparative static w.r.t. φ is ambiguous and analytically diﬃ0 and
∂ψ
cult to trace, so we don’t examine it here.
e − (E +
For the F curve, we examine the number of firms, given by nF = Ω(E U
∂nF
= −(E + 1)ω < 0. Moreover, for a given
1)UO )). We immediately note that
∂UO
e
∂nF
dU
1
UO , we have
= Eω
= −Eω
< 0.
∂ψ
dψ
1−δ
dnF
∂nF ∂nF ∂UO
∂nF
The total eﬀect of increasing ψ is thus given by
=
+
=
<
dψ
∂ψ ∂UO ∂ψ
∂ψ
0, so that an increase in ψ leaves the M unaﬀected and shifts the F curve backwards,
resulting in a lower nF and also a lower UO .

7.10

Proof of Proposition 9

For ψ < ψ M there can be generators in the market. This means that there are
five types of agents: firm owners, firm employees, market idea-bearers, market opportunists, and market idea generators. We have nF + nE + nI + nO + nG = 1.
F
The number of employees leaving in any period is again given by nL = nE φ fI =
b
φ
F
nF Eφ
, but now ideas are also generated by market agents, so that the numb
1+φ
ber of idea-bearer in the market is now given by nI,t = nL,t−1 + φnI,t−1 + nG ⇔
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F
b
φ
1
nL + nG
nI
1−θ
φ
+ nG . From θ =
nI =
we get nO =
⇔ nI = nF E
nI
b φ
φ
φ 1+φ
nI + nO
θ
which we use in (E + 1)nF + nG + nI + nO = 1 ⇔ nI = θ(1 − nG − (E + 1)nF ).
F
b
φ
1
φ
+ nG which we solve to obtain
Thus θ(1 − nG − (E + 1)nF ) = nF E
b
φ 1+φ
φ
b
φ
F
φθ − φθ(E + 1)nF − EnF φ
b
1+φ
. This expresses nG as a function of nF
nG =
1 + φθ
and θ. We can do the same for nI using nI = θ(1 − nG − nF ) and for nO using
1−θ
nO =
nI . This implies that we can express all of the equilibrium fractions as
θ
a function of nF and θ. We now show how these two variables are determined in
equilibrium.
A market equilibrium requires UE = UG = UO . From Proposition 2, we know that
ψ
ψ
δ∆
UG = UO implies θ = θM = δ −
and that as a result we have UO =
−
.
∆
1−δ 1−δ
This constitutes the M curve. It says that the market utility is now established by
∂UO
market exchange, and that the number of firms does not aﬀect it. Formally,
= 0,
∂nF
∂UO
1
∂UO
which makes the M flat. Moreover, we have
= −
< 0 and
=
∂ψ
1−δ
∂z
φ
δ∆
e − (E + 1)UO )), so
> 0. The F curve is again given by nF = Ω(E U
1 − δ 2 − δ + φδ
that its comparative statics are identical to those of Proposition 8.
An increase in ψ shift down both the F and M curves, implying a lower value
of UO . The total eﬀect on nF , however, is ambiguous since an inward shift of the F
curve decreases nF , but the downward shift of the M curve increases nF . To examine
∂nF ∂nF ∂UO
1
1
dnF
=
+
= −Eω
+
(E +1)ω =
the total eﬀect, we note that
dψ
∂ψ ∂UO ∂ψ
1−δ 1−δ
ω
> 0.
1−δ
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Table 1: Key notation
b
c
E
F
Kj
ni
s
Ui
z
ψ
ψi
δ
∆
φ
θ
Ω

Bonus for idea generation: percentage share of idea value
Transaction of cost of using NDAs
Total number of employees within a firm
Total number of matches available within the firm (includes replacements)
Fixed entry cost of j th entrant
Number (or density) of agents if type i
Equity share of idea-bearer with NDA
Life—time utility of type i
Value of completed idea
Private idea generation costs
Upper boundary of the feasible range, under i equilibrium
Discount factor across periods
= UI − UO : Premium of being an idea-bearer
Probability that listener is complementor
Fraction of idea-bearer in the market
Distribution of fixed costs

Common subscripts
E
F
G
I
O

Subscript
Subscript
Subscript
Subscript
Subscript

for
for
for
for
for

employees
firms
idea generators
idea-bearers
opportunists

Common superscripts
M
N
S

Superscript for market equilibrium
Superscript for NDA equilibrium
Superscript for socially eﬃcient equilibrium
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Figure 1: Coexistence equilibrium

Figure 2: The effect of higher generation cost (ψ)
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Higher costs decrease firm density and the utility of market agents

Figure 3: The effect of higher idea values (z)

Figure 4: Firm density and idea generation costs
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